How the West Guaranteed Conflict in Ukraine

The 2014 Maidan Coup was the immediate trigger for the crisis that escalated after a slow burn into 2021. The war became inevitable after the West rejected the diplomatic overtures made by Russia in December 2021.

The Run-Up to the Conflict Was Clear

When autumn 2021 approached, I was watching (and analyzing) the developments in Eastern Europe quite closely and I deduced and predicted (in a letter I wrote to an assistant of an MEP in Brussels in September 2021), “the situation between Russia and NATO must come to a head soon, if NATO does not back down and stand down on the matter of expansion into Ukraine, Russia will invade Ukraine sometime between the end of February and the middle of March in 2022, with the exact date to be determined by the ground freezing hard enough to support mechanized operations, and logistical preparations being complete. It is obvious to me the Russians are very serious about the situation, and if the West does not take their concerns seriously, the matter will be resolved via war. It isn’t necessary, because the Russian requests and demands are reasonable and could be realistically met, but the West will make it necessary by refusing to listen. The preparations made by the Russians are not a bluff; it is serious. They are preparing for war, and they will go to war over this. The forces mobilized for Zapad 2021 will not demobilize and return to their normal barracks; they will be quietly inserted to forward staging areas. If this dispute cannot be resolved peacefully, war will begin in late February 2022 or early March 2022.”

Numerous off-ramps existed; Russia invited Western Negotiation

Having looked over the terms of the December 2021 Russian “ultimatum” Russia delivered to the West, I failed to find any terms that leapt out as outrageous or that would require an immediate rejection by the USA. Most of the terms could have been met with immediate agreement, a few would have required clarification, and perhaps one or two would have required revision or modification, but the thrust, the crux of the ultimatum, was very reasonable.

Having read through those terms, I calculate that all of the terms are reasonable, with the only exception being that clarification would have been required on the point of Article 4, “The Russian Federation and all Parties, which were as of 27 May 1997 by the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, respectively, do not deploy their armed forces and weapons in all other European States in addition to the forces deployed in that territory as at 27 May 1997.”

If it means, “Outside NATO forces will not deploy on the territories of NATO members who joined after 1997,” that is sensible and could have been granted and met. If it means “no NATO forces can be on the territories of any NATO member who joined after 1997,” that makes no sense because it would logically apply to those post-1997 members themselves and would, in theory, require them to not have their own national forces. Clarification would have been needed on that point.

As to Article 7, “The members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization refuse to conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine, as well as other states of Eastern Europe, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia.” The matter would have been very simple and straightforward for the US to agree to, and it should have been accepted.

Looking through the articles, it........

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