Iranian Counterattacks: A Response to US and Israeli Aggression

The aggression by the United States and Israel against Iran, unleashed with the use of the military and energy infrastructure of Middle Eastern countries, compels Tehran to launch counterattacks in self-defence. Iran had previously warned of its retaliatory actions.

The Use of Third Countries’ Territory

Tehran’s retaliatory measures against Israel also cross the airspace of third countries. However, Iran is compelled to act within the framework of its right to self-defence, as the war was started by Israel and the United States. Assessing the experience of the 12-day war, the Iranian authorities warned all the Middle Eastern and neighbouring states in advance about the inadmissibility of granting their territory and airspace for aggression. Otherwise, Iran would consider those countries as accomplices of the United States and Israel and perceive them as legitimate military targets.

The warnings from the Iranian side were received differently by the countries of the region. Riyadh publicly advocated for a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian crisis, but in reality, high-ranking Saudi officials (such as Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman) were pushing the Americans towards war with Iran, arguing that Tehran’s position in the region was strengthening and that US idleness would demonstrate weakness.

Escalation of the Conflict and Regional Consequences

With the onset of hostilities, the United States started actively using its military (naval and air) bases in all the aforementioned Middle Eastern countries. This made Iran constrained to carry out missile and drone attacks on the military and energy infrastructure of the Arab Gulf states, as well as on US diplomatic missions in those countries.

Unfortunately, the Iranian retaliatory measures affect not only military and energy infrastructure facilities but also civilian infrastructure (hotels, residential complexes, transport links). Iran justifies this by them being used and occupied by US military personnel and diplomats. The warnings and the involvement of Arab states’ air defence systems in repelling regular Iranian attacks are, in fact, escalating the conflict to a regional scale. The UAE, having experienced the horror of Iran’s missile and drone responses, has officially stated its refusal to provide its territory to the US for attacks on Iran, which has caused discontent in Washington.

The Global Energy Crisis and Geopolitical Stakes

Another negative consequence of the war against Iran is the development of a global crisis in oil and gas prices. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is conducting targeted strikes on oil fields and refineries in Iraq and the Gulf states, aiming to reduce oil production. Furthermore, Iran is blocking the entry and exit of oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. Similarly, the gas infrastructure of regional countries, primarily that of Qatar, is a target of Iranian military strikes.

This tactic by the Iranian armed forces provokes retaliatory strikes from the United States and Israel on Iran’s own oil and gas infrastructure. Washington, in doing so, pursues a twofold objective: establishing complete control over the global oil market and inflicting maximum damage on the Sino-Iranian energy partnership. The reduction in Iranian oil supplies, according to the US calculations, is supposed to undermine the growth rate of the Chinese economy.

Escalation of Tensions in the Middle East: Expansion of the Anti-Iran Coalition and Risks for the Region

The United States and Israel are actively seeking to expand the circle of participants in the anti-Iranian campaign, drawing in countries such as Cyprus, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Washington and Tel Aviv are not limiting themselves to using the existing military infrastructure of Middle Eastern states; they are actively relocating their capabilities to Cyprus.

This shift in focus makes Cyprus a potential military target for Iran, which will inevitably lead to further escalation of the conflict. A strike on Cyprus would, in turn, inevitably draw Greece, France, and Great Britain into the confrontation. In response to the threat, Athens is already deploying F-16 fighters to the island; Paris is sending the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle; and London has made its air force bases available to the Americans and is dispatching the aircraft carrier Prince of Wales to the region.

The Position of Turkey and Azerbaijan: Between Criticism and the Risk of Involvement

Ankara initially adopted a measured position. On one hand, the Turkish authorities strongly condemned the aggression of the US-Israeli coalition against Iran, evaluating it as a result of pressure and provocations from B. Netanyahu’s government. On the other hand, Turkey consistently advocates for the hostilities to cease and for the negotiations to be resumed between the United States and Iran.

On Turkish territory, there is the large US air base Incirlik, located in Adana, and the crucial NATO missile defence base in Kürecik. The use of this infrastructure in the interests of the US and Israel would inevitably provoke a response from Iran. Given the experience of the CIA and Mossad in conducting covert operations, one cannot rule out the possibility of subversive activities by these intelligence services, including orchestrating false flag attacks on Turkey and its ally Azerbaijan, making it seem as if they were conducted by Iran. Such provocations would be aimed at drawing the Turkic states into the anti-Iran coalition.

Missile Incidents: Attempted Provocations?

The first such incident occurred on 4 March, when the NATO missile defence system detected and shot down an Iranian ballistic missile in the airspace of Turkey’s Hatay province. Ankara condemned the attack demanded explanations from Tehran, a serious investigation, and the prevention of such incidents in the future. Turkey stated it was taking all measures to ensure its security, initiated consultations with its NATO allies, and reserved the right to retaliate.

Iranian President M. Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister A. Araghchi at the time apologised to Turkey, explaining the incident as a ballistic missile deviating from its course towards Cyprus. However, this explanation raises questions, as in other instances Iranian ballistic missiles have not deviated by such a distance. The peculiarities of the ‘Iranian attack’ on Turkey did not end there: the UK Ministry of Defence suggested that the strike on Turkey might have been carried out not by Iran, but by Israel, with the aim of drawing Ankara into a conflict with Tehran.

The information about Iran targeting Cyprus led Turkey, which acts as a guarantor of security for the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, to decide, following in the footsteps of Greece, to send six F-16 fighters and air defence systems to the Turkish part of the island.

A second incident involving an Iranian ballistic missile occurred on 9 March near the province of Gaziantep. Ankara has so far limited itself to condemnation and calls for restraint from Iran. Tehran again denied involvement in the missile strike on Turkey, with Iranian Foreign Minister A. Araghchi proposing to his Turkish counterpart H. Fidan the creation of a joint commission for investigation.

Azerbaijan Under Attack: Rising Tensions in the Caucasus

The next example of escalating military tension in the region was a drone strike on 5 March targeting the airport building and a school in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. Fortunately, these attacks did not inflict casualties, but they caused understandable alarm in Baku. President Ilham Aliyev lambasted the action. Baku had previously assured the Iranian side that in the event of war, Azerbaijan would not participate and would not grant its territory to third countries.

In response to the alleged drone attack, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev summoned an emergency meeting of the National Security Council, where they declared a heightened state of combat readiness for the army, and troops began being redeployed to the border with the Islamic Republic of Iran. For several days, Azerbaijan closed its border to lorries and initiated consultations with Turkey under the terms of the Shusha Declaration of 2021.

Baku sent harsh threats towards Tehran, declaring its readiness to employ an ‘iron fist.’ Local media actively covered the expected international support from Turkey, the US, Israel, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, Albania, Pakistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In protest, Aliyev recalled his ambassador from Tehran and temporarily closed the consulate in Tabriz.

A day after the incident, the Azerbaijani State Security Service announced the detention of eight individuals suspected of links with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to the institution, the detainees were planning acts of sabotage, including blowing up the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, as well as attacks on the Israeli embassy and a synagogue.

Peculiarities and Questions with No Answers

However, the situation was accompanied by a number of inconsistencies. The IRGC General Jabbari expressed doubt about Iran’s involvement in the attack, questioning why low-powered drones would be used if the goal was a serious strike. Azerbaijani journalist Rahim Shaliyev, meanwhile, unearthed inscriptions in the Azerbaijani language on the wreckage of the downed drones.

The lightning-fast reaction of the Azerbaijani counterintelligence, which promptly exposed the alleged IRGC agent network, also raises questions. It suggests that someone might have been ‘waiting’ for an Iranian attack to prepare the information landscape for retaliatory measures. Against this backdrop, Israel’s Channel 11 suggested the possibility of Azerbaijan soon joining the war against Iran.

De-escalation and Mutual Recriminations

Iranian President M. Pezeshkian reassured I. Aliyev about Tehran not having carried out strikes on Nakhchivan. Subsequently, Baku lowered the temperature in its relations with Tehran, reopened the border, and provided humanitarian aid to Iran.

Meanwhile, representatives of the IRGC and the head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, vehemently rejected Azerbaijan’s accusations of having undertaken the drone attack. They emphasised their commitment to friendly relations with neighbours and called on Baku to cease cooperation with the Zionists and Americans, warning of possible retaliatory strikes.

Iran’s Domestic Politics and Regional Stability

US President Donald Trump perceives and assesses M. Pezeshkian favourably, while conservative Iranian leaders such as A. Larijani and M. Ghalibaf face sharp criticism. If Pezeshkian advocates for ceasing strikes on neighbouring countries, Larijani and Ghalibaf, supported by the IRGC, come out with the opposite stance. The jury is still out on whether the newly elected Supreme Spiritual Leader Mojtaba Khamenei will adhere to a centrist policy and ensure balance in the decision-making processes, or he will opt for the path of ‘vendetta’ for his father’s killing. It is all to be seen in the near future.

Alexander SVARANTS – PhD in Politics, Professor, Specialist in Turkish Studies, Expert on Middle Eastern Countries

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