Elections in Armenia: expectations and apprehension of external players

One of the features of the parliamentary elections that have taken place in Armenia is the geopolitical dimension of their outcome. What will the foreign policy course of Yerevan constitute, in the view of the rapid events and transformations unfolding in the world and in the region?

Nikol Pashinyan’s success is obvious, but not absolute

Although at the same time, the incumbent prime minister makes fairly active use of administrative resources and the security forces to suppress the very centres of that democracy represented by those who disagree with him, and at times does not mince his words in non-public settings. Repressions against representatives of the opposition, the clergy, and Karabakh Armenians have become commonplace in Pashinyan’s domestic political practice.

In the Armenian community, the prevailing view is that Nikol will stop at nothing in his struggle for power. Perhaps, it is because of the stakes being too high for him, since losing power could put him behind bars for a number of deliberate illegal actions, or perhaps power is such a drug that he cannot break the habit and imagine himself once again in the role of a local press editor.

However, despite his lust for power and administrative capabilities on the one hand, and evidence of gross violations during the elections on the other, Nikol Pashinyan refrained from claiming 50 per cent or more of the votes for himself (although in fact and in essence he could have easily done it). It begs a legitimate question: why? He managed to retain the post of prime minister, but he has not secured an absolute majority (in particular, a constitutional majority). Furthermore, the new composition of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia includes, in addition to the ruling “Civic Contract” party, two opposition forces—“Strong Armenia” and the “Armenia” bloc (while the “Prosperous Armenia” party failed to enter the 9th-convocation parliament by a margin of 0.01%), and both are pro-Russian in orientation.

In other words, Pashinyan, having requested financial and political support from Europe on the eve of the elections, ostensibly in the face of the threat of external unnamed pressure, and also having administrative resources at his disposal, nevertheless did not allow an alternative pro-Western party into the new parliament (although there are many of them).

Some will say that such was the choice of the Armenians themselves (or almost 49.8% of the 59% of the Armenian electorate who came to the polls). Others will suppose that there is a split in the Armenian society, with the election outcomes reflecting the real balance of forces. But at the same time, there is an opinion that Nikol, with such a composition, decided to protect himself from new troubles.

How can he achieve peace with Azerbaijan without fulfilling President Aliyev’s demands regarding the change of the constitution, and how can he retain power in Armenia if........

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