Armenia Bolsters Ties with the US

From February 9th to 10th, Armenia for the first time in its history hosted a high-ranking US official with the status of a vice-president. Some experts link the symbolism of this event to the upcoming Armenian parliamentary elections scheduled for June, suggesting that Yerevan is increasingly gravitating towards the United States rather than Europe.

Consequences of the Karabakh War and the Search for New Allies

Between 2021 and 2023, Baku repeatedly attempted to force a breakthrough in the southern part of Armenia to gain control over Zangezur. However, these aggressive actions did not yield the desired result. The reason lay not so much in military factors (although the balance of power had been tilted in Azerbaijan’s favour since the 2010s), but in political consequences: establishing an ITC across a territory which was annexed, yet internationally recognized as Armenian was extremely challenging. Yerevan refused to implement clause 9 of the trilateral agreement of November 10, 2020 (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia), concerning the unblocking of communications in the south of the country under the control of the Russian FSB Border Service. This was explained by the fact that all other 8 clauses of this document had been grossly violated by Baku.

The Role of Regional Players and Disillusionment with Traditional Partners

Iran provided active diplomatic support in preserving Armenia’s territorial integrity, since imposing exclusive control over the Zangezur Corridor by Turkey and Azerbaijan posed a serious threat to Tehran. Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukrainian crisis and its partnership with Turkey created additional problems for Armenia’s strategic security. Moscow, interested in maintaining allied relations with Azerbaijan, did not take a unilateral position in favor of Yerevan, attempting to resolve the regional crisis through political negotiations.

The Armenian defeat in Karabakh contributed to strengthening Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus and invigorated Ankara’s plans for a forced penetration into Central Asia. Armenia faced the threat of a new military conflict. In this situation, Prime Minister Pashinyan began seeking an alternative in the form of the collective West. Initially, Yerevan bet on Paris and Brussels. The expansion of Armenian-French and Armenian-European ties led to the EU observer mission on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. However, neither France nor the EU could keep Karabakh Armenian, and in autumn 2022, in Prague, they insisted on Armenia’s public renunciation of its rights to Nagorno-Karabakh.

The communication project “Crossroads of Peace,” initiated by Nikol Pashinyan’s government in 2023, did not receive due attention from Azerbaijan and Turkey. Yerevan essentially rejected Russian mediation in negotiations with Baku, switching to a bilateral dialogue, while Azerbaijan continued to coordinate its steps with Turkey.

As a result, June 2025 became decisive: Armenia made new concessions in terms of border demarcation with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan’s meetings with Aliyev in Abu Dhabi and with Erdoğan in Ankara signaled a course towards the administration of the US President Donald Trump.

Armenia agreed to open up the road through Zangezur for the Middle Corridor, enabling connectivity between Central Asia and Azerbaijan with Turkey and Europe under the oversight of the US. On August 8, 2025, the Washington Agreement was signed to create a new route, the “Trump Road” (TRIPP), through the Meghri district of Zangezur (Syunik) under US control for a period of 99 years.

Thus, Yerevan’s declared course towards integration with the EU is merely a demonstration of a new vector of Armenian diplomacy in favour of the West. Armenia’s true intention is to bet not on the weak and contradictory EU, which confirmed its inability to provide strategic security guarantees in the situation with Ukraine, but on the United States, capable of containing Turkey’s aggressive aspirations towards the Armenian state.

This is why Nikol Pashinyan states in Moscow that he does not yet intend to leave the EAEU and the CSTO in favour of the EU. Yerevan perfectly understands the incompatibility, from regulatory, legal, economic, military, and political points of view, of simultaneous membership in Russian and European integration institutions. Europe is of an interest for Armenia only as a Western market towards which all other partners are heading (China, India, Russia, Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Iran). The “Trump Road” through Armenia could provide such a connecting route for all the listed countries. The control over the new route will be shifted to the US.

J.D. Vance’s Visit to Armenia: Strategic Partnership and New Horizons of Cooperation

This January, following the signing in Washington of an Armenian-American agreement on the establishment of a joint venture (between Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio), the parties launched the mechanism for the practical implementation of the TRIPP project. This project aims at creating multimodal and unimpeded transit communication across Armenian territory. They also announced the upcoming visit of US Vice President J.D. Vance to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The two-day visit of the second-ranking figure in the American administration to Yerevan on February 9-10 was of particular significance. Vance made statements about the intention to establish high-level, trustful relations and to make large-scale investments in Armenia. It is important to note that in January 2025, at the end of Joseph Biden’s presidency, the US had already signed an agreement with Armenia on establishing strategic partnership relations. At the time, many experts expressed doubts about the continuity of this course, assuming that the elected President Donald Trump might renounce his predecessor’s commitments, especially given their personal animosity. However, in Armenia’s case, Trump apparently supported the 46th US President’s decision.

During his visit, Vance praised the TRIPP project and its role in the US regional strategy. Simultaneously, he announced the successful conclusion of US-Armenian negotiations on the “123 Agreement,” which regulates cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In the realms of this agreement, the construction of a Small Modular Reactor (SMR) in Armenia is planned, with a total investment of $9 billion. $5 billion out of the total will be directed towards the constructing the reactor per se, with $4 billion being allocated for strategic maintenance, including personnel training, fuel supply, and security.

Another important area of cooperation between the US and Armenia will be the supply of modern vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the Shield AI MQ-35 V-BAT type, distinguished by their high cost and advanced technology.

Finally, the most promising project within the framework of long-term American-Armenian partnership is a unique proposal in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). The initiative presupposes large-scale production of dual-use chips in Armenia and the placement of the Firebird AI data centre in the country using NVIDIA technologies. The US is extremely selective in transferring such high-tech developments. The Americans have entrusted chip production only to a limited number of countries, including the UK, Israel, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and partially France and Germany, strictly regulated by the US export control system.

Commenting on this partnership direction at a press conference in Yerevan, Vance stated: “We are talking about chips that do not and cannot exist in most countries of the world. Now they will be produced here… Armenia can become a linchpin for the region’s economic development.”

Veiled Risks for Armenia

The visit of US Senator J.D. Vance to Yerevan vividly testified to the growing trust of the US in Armenia. Washington has demonstrated readiness to transfer modern technologies, including unmanned systems, and announced large-scale investments and the implementation of joint communication and energy projects. These steps undoubtedly reflect Yerevan’s strategic course and strike a chord with Washington. The visit took place just four months before the parliamentary elections in Armenia. And this fact is of particular significance, given that in his speech, Vance openly articulated support for Nikol Pashinyan’s candidacy, calling him an acceptable partner for the US, which they associate the emerging positive changes in bilateral relations with.

However, American initiatives, particularly plans for building a Small Modular Reactor (SMR) and supplying expensive reconnaissance drones, have caused serious concern among a number of experts and amidst the Armenian opposition.

SMR: Political Calculation and Technological Doubts

Pashinyan’s government plans to replace the outdated Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant with an American SMR, which, according to critics, are dictated more by political considerations rather than those lying in the economic sphere. The main goal appears to be reducing Armenia’s energy dependence on Russia and strengthening ties with the US.

There is a fear that the US might use Armenia as a “testing ground” for its SMR technologies. There currently is not a single commercially operational modular reactor of the type in the United States per se. The example of the company NuScale, whose project in Idaho was cancelled in 2023 for economic reasons, is indicative. The main problem with American SMRs is the lack of final field results confirming their reliability and safety. Moreover, these projects remain very costly.

What is also particularly concerning is that SMRs produce 30 times more high-level radioactive waste per unit of energy compared to traditional reactors. The costs of their long-term storage could be an unmanageable cross to bear for Armenia’s budget. Any technical shortcomings in terms of safety could render the nuclear project economically unviable and create a threat both for Armenia and the entire region. Against this backdrop, reliable, economically viable, modern, and safe reactors offered by Russia look more attractive. Furthermore, no global insurance company would take on accurately assessing the risks associated with American SMRs.

V-BAT UAVs: Inequality and Potential Interference

As for the V-BAT drones, their cost exceeds $500,000 per unit, depending on equipment. With $11 million allocated by the US, Armenia will be able to purchase only between 5 and 22 such drones. This quantity cannot significantly affect the balance of power with Azerbaijan, which has billions of dollars at its disposal to purchase systems of this kind. There is a possibility of this small number of UAVs being later used by the American side in Armenia to monitor the situation on the border with Iran.

The public support for Nikol Pashinyan from Senator Vance on the eve of the Armenian parliamentary elections begs the question of the US possibly interfering with Armenia’s internal affairs. It is significant to remember that long-term interstate relations are built not between individuals, but between peoples and countries.

Alexander Svarants – PhD in Political Sciences, professor, expert in Turkish Studies and on Middle Eastern countries

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