Iran once again finds itself around the negotiating table with the Unted States. Its resolve is still strong, believing righteousness and time remain on its side, but it has been weakened, that much it cannot deny. 

I come from a dealmaking world, where asserting leverage is crucial for getting a favourable agreement but how can Iran do that when it is coming from a position of perceived weakness? What are the steps they could take to flip that and begin to negotiate from a position of strength?

Iran’s Current Position

The weakening of Iran began with the denigration of its ‘axis of resistance’. Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias and Houthis once provided a formidable joint threat but have been largely degraded by joint Israeli and US operations. 

Iran has been made to look potentially like a paper tiger, unable to suitably defend its allies or mount a meaningful military threat. At the same time, Washington’s policy of “maximum pressure” continues to constrain its economy and limit its room for manoeuvre.

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The protests represented the most serious challenge to the regime’s legitimacy in decades. In any political system, authority rests not only on power but on consent. Faced with this challenge, the regime fell back on hard power, which may preserve control in the short term but corrodes leverage over time. 

In that respect, Iran’s approach mirrors that of the United States under Trump: a belief that coercion can be a substitute for consent. The crucial difference is capacity. Washington can sustain “might is right”; for Tehran it simply looks like a last roll of the dice.

The Tasnim Battle Plan

So how does a state that is objectively weaker still negotiate from a position of strength? We are now much clearer on how the Iranian regime imagines this playing out after a detailed battle plan was published by Tasnim, the news agency affiliated to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 

The first step, they say, is to redefine the battlefield.

Iran cannot outmatch the US conventionally. What it can do is make any conflict so costly, unpredictable, and regionally destabilising that diplomacy becomes the rational alternative.

Iran cannot outmatch the US conventionally. What it can do is make any conflict so costly, unpredictable, and regionally destabilising that diplomacy becomes the rational alternative.

It is not about defeating America outright, but about raising the cost of American action. Rather than stopping a US or Israeli strike, Iran would aim to survive it and then retaliate asymmetrically. This would include missile and drone attacks on regional bases, activation of allied groups, cyber operations against critical infrastructure, and the threat to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil flows.

Take the swat a fly analogy. One fly, a drone, flying near a warship caused the US military to have to scramble F-35s. Imagine them having to take down a swarm of flies? What would that do to the US? How many flies can they swot down simultaneously? This is the hallmark of asymmetric warfare. 

Take the swat a fly analogy. One fly, a drone, flying near a warship caused the US military to have to scramble F-35s. Imagine them having to take down a swarm of flies? What would that do to the US? How many flies can they swot down simultaneously? This is the hallmark of asymmetric warfare. 

The cost of that action would force Israel to think very carefully about whether they’re willing to gamble away their recent regional wins, even if it were a calculated gamble. Would they be taking on more than they can chew or do they only stay in power through perpetual conflicts? 

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Yet this strategy has limits. Much of Iran’s proxy network has already been degraded. Only Houthis have thus far respected the call, Iraqi militias are on the sidelines, Lebanon is divided and Syria non-existent. And while Iran may seek to overwhelm missile defences through sheer volume, the US retains significant conventional and cyber superiority. Moreover, closing Hormuz would hurt Iran as much as its adversaries; oil exports are the lifeblood of its economy.

This is where negotiation, rather than escalation, becomes the rational path.

A credible path forward

Despite many rounds of failed talks, the dealmaker in me still believes there is a route to a deal that will satisfy both sides. 

Publicly, Iran could recommit to limiting enrichment to internationally accepted levels. Their existing enriched stockpile could either be transferred intact for safekeeping in a third country under IAEA supervision with the custodian transferring it back should conflict break out (better option for Iran) or downgrade it from 60% to non-weapon grade under supervision (the option currently on offer).

Privately, a more creative structure could unlock real economic gains. An independent trading entity based in Switzerland could intermediate Iranian oil sales under agreed terms. In return for lifting sanctions Iran would gain access to market prices rather than being forced to sell at steep discounts, with a modest commission paid to the intermediary. 

This would allow Washington to claim sanctions relief was controlled, while giving Tehran tangible economic breathing space. Inviting US companies to export Iranian oil would bring economic gains for both sides, thus interlocking them in a similar way to the ‘Rubio’ structure of selling Venezuelan oil through Qatar. 

Of course, alone this wouldn’t be enough. Any durable settlement would ultimately require codifying mutual non-aggression, clearly defining defensive military posture, reducing proxy engagement, refraining from questioning Israel’s right to exist and moving towards a more democratic and transparent election process. 

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Thinking outside the box, what if Iran were to express interest in joining the Board of Peace? As an initiative personally connected with President Trump, any diplomatic breakthrough under its umbrella would be seen as his success – a powerful incentive in Washington. I’m sure the Saudis, Qataris and Turks would welcome it and for the US it would be a major policy win. It could even help persuade US, Europe and Russia to join as they would not like to be left out. 

For Iran, joining such a framework would shift the Palestinian statehood and Gaza question from being an exclusively Iranian issue to a multilateral diplomatic process. If linked to progress on sanctions relief and security guarantees, the Board of Peace could become the architect of a wider regional non-aggression pact.

Perhaps now instead of tinkering with the Abraham Accords which look very unlikely to expand, the time has arrived for a NATO style treaty called MENATO – Middle East North Africa Treaty Organisation to absorb the bilateral, trilateral and other pacts that are being done on a sporadic, ad-hoc basis. If peace is to be brought to the Middle East, then it is incumbent for the US, China, Russia, Europe to collaborate and implement this. 

Ultimately, negotiating from perceived weakness requires three things: recognising reality without accepting humiliation; identifying where leverage still exists, however asymmetric; and translating that into a structure which creates shared benefits rather than zero-sum outcomes.

Ultimately, negotiating from perceived weakness requires three things: recognising reality without accepting humiliation; identifying where leverage still exists, however asymmetric; and translating that into a structure which creates shared benefits rather than zero-sum outcomes.

Iran may be diminished, but it is not powerless. Whether it chooses escalation or the harder path of structured compromise will shape not just its future, but that of the wider region. This is a dangerous game of poker: one side is showing its hand; the other not…

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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