Nearly seven months after President Mahmoud Abbas formed the constitutional drafting committee, the president moved a few days ago to release the draft “Interim Constitution of the State of Palestine” to the public and to relevant institutions for review and comment over a 60-day period. The designated committee is expected to receive, compile, and examine these submissions, then produce an initial report within two months. This would be followed by a detailed assessment of the findings and a set of recommendations, paving the way for a final version of the constitutional draft before it is put to a popular referendum. The question, however, remains unresolved: does this step amount to a genuine initiative to establish a constitution for the State of Palestine, or is it largely a response to a particularly complex political moment, much as in previous phases? More pointedly, does the new draft offer credible solutions to a political and constitutional crisis that has defied resolution for years, and that would justify its emergence at this juncture?

Several months ago, President Mahmoud Abbas unveiled, through a presidential decree, an ambitious plan for institutional transformation, framed as preparation for a transition from authority to statehood. The plan calls for the drafting of an interim constitution by October of this year, followed by elections to the Palestinian National Council the following month. On more than one occasion, the president has also reiterated his commitment to holding comprehensive presidential and parliamentary elections within a single year once the war on Gaza comes to an end. In his address to the United Nations last year, Abbas explicitly linked the mandate given to the interim constitutional drafting committee to what he described as “part of the reform effort.” This comes amid sustained calls from numerous countries urging the Palestinians to undertake political reforms across their institutions, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation itself. These developments also coincide with a significant wave of recognitions of the State of Palestine by Western countries, following the crimes committed by the occupation authorities in Gaza during the latest war, as well as the unprecedented pressure exerted by those authorities in the West Bank. Together, these factors have placed additional strain on an already complex Palestinian political landscape. The Palestinian experience with adopting the Basic Law, amending it in 2003 and 2005, and reviving the constitutional committee in 2011 all point to a recurring pattern: such decisions have consistently been shaped, if not driven, by prevailing political considerations.

The Palestinian Legislative Council adopted the Basic Law in 1997, designating it as an interim constitution for the Palestinian Authority. Under the Oslo Accords, the transitional period was set at five years, after which final-status issues were to be resolved, an arrangement that was supposed to conclude in 1999. President Yasser Arafat did not ratify the Basic Law at the time. Instead, he moved in 1999 to establish a committee tasked with drafting a constitution for a future Palestinian state, headed by Nabil Shaath. It was not until 2002 that Arafat approved the Interim Palestinian Basic Law, three years after the occupation government had refused to bring the transitional phase to an end as stipulated in the agreements for 1999. This decision also coincided with major political developments on the ground in the Palestinian territories, following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the sweeping Israeli policies that accompanied it, including military incursions, targeted killings, and a systematic effort to undermine, contain, and erode the standing of the Palestinian Authority.

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In April 2003, a Road Map was released that explicitly tied political progress in the Palestinian territories to the reform of Palestinian Authority institutions and the construction of effective governance structures. That same year, far-reaching amendments were introduced to the Palestinian Basic Law, altering the very nature of the political system by creating the post of prime minister for the first time. These changes were accompanied by new constitutional arrangements designed to delineate the respective powers of the president and the newly established prime minister. The 2003 amendment states explicitly that the president appoints the prime minister (Article 45). It also introduced an entire chapter on the executive authority, assigning executive and administrative powers to the Council of Ministers (Article 63), while clearly spelling out the authorities and responsibilities of the prime minister (Article 68).

In 2005, new constitutional amendments were adopted following the death of Yasser Arafat. These changes focused primarily on reshaping the electoral system in a way that enabled Hamas to participate in the legislative elections, after a national consensus was reached among Palestinian factions to proceed with the vote.

In 2005, new constitutional amendments were adopted following the death of Yasser Arafat. These changes focused primarily on reshaping the electoral system in a way that enabled Hamas to participate in the legislative elections, after a national consensus was reached among Palestinian factions to proceed with the vote.

This marked a pivotal moment in Palestinian politics, bringing Hamas formally into the institutional electoral arena. Among these amendments, the Basic Law also established, explicitly for the first time, a four-year term for both the presidency and the Legislative Council. Prior to this revision, neither mandate had a clearly defined duration, as both were tied to the end of the transitional period stipulated in earlier political agreements. The 2005 amendments thus sought to normalize the constitutional framework of governance, anchoring political authority in fixed electoral cycles rather than open-ended transitional arrangements.

Against the backdrop of shifting political dynamics, and a growing number of states recognising Palestine in the wake of Israel’s 2008–2009 war on Gaza, alongside the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to secure recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations, President Mahmoud Abbas moved in 2011 to reactivate the constitutional drafting committee in order to deliberate on what was described as a fourth and final draft. The committee itself was originally established by a decision of President Yasser Arafat in November 1999 and was chaired by Nabil Shaath. Its mandate was to prepare a permanent constitution for a future Palestinian state. The committee operated within the institutional framework of the Palestine Liberation Organization, specifically through the Central Council. The first draft was completed in late December 2000 and made public in February 2001. Subsequent revisions followed, culminating in a third draft that was submitted to the Central Council on 9 March 2003.

This section turns to the second question: whether the new constitutional draft released earlier this year, comprising a preamble, 13 chapters, and 162 articles, offers viable solutions to the political and constitutional crises that have persisted since 2007. A careful review of several key criticisms directed at the latest draft, when set against current political realities, provides a clear framework for answering that question. By examining these critiques in relation to the existing system of governance and the lived experience of Palestinian politics over the past decade and a half, it becomes possible to assess whether the draft represents a meaningful corrective to entrenched dysfunction, or merely a reformulation of unresolved tensions.

In 2007, following the Palestinian political split, the application of the Palestinian Basic Law came under profound strain. The crisis centered on a series of unresolved constitutional questions: the president’s declaration of a state of emergency, the formation of an emergency government, calls for a popular referendum, the dissolution of the Legislative Council, and the subsequent issuance of presidential decrees carrying the force of law. These measures were taken despite the fact that the state of emergency is constitutionally time-bound, and unfolded amid the prolonged paralysis of the legislature and the absence of both presidential and parliamentary elections in the years that followed. This prolonged constitutional vacuum effectively compelled the Palestinian Authority to reactivate the institutional structures of the Palestine Liberation Organization in a largely formal and symbolic manner, as a substitute framework for political legitimacy and decision-making in the absence of a functioning legislative body.

Key criticisms circulating around the draft “Interim Constitution of the State of Palestine 2026” (currently open for public comment)

The first major criticism concerns the composition and provenance of the constitutional drafting committee itself. In theory, such a body should have reflected a careful political balance, particularly in the context of a deep and persistent partisan divide and the absence of a functioning parliament…

The first major criticism concerns the composition and provenance of the constitutional drafting committee itself. In theory, such a body should have reflected a careful political balance, particularly in the context of a deep and persistent partisan divide and the absence of a functioning parliament…

the only legitimate framework capable of absorbing and managing this kind of fragmentation.

Instead, the committee’s makeup has raised questions about representativeness and inclusivity at a moment when constitutional legitimacy is already severely contested.

Instead, the committee’s makeup has raised questions about representativeness and inclusivity at a moment when constitutional legitimacy is already severely contested.

The second criticism is closely linked to the first. Under the final article of the draft, the adoption of the constitution is ultimately tied to a presidential decision. Given the political realities outlined above, most notably the lack of an elected legislature and the prolonged suspension of the electoral process, this provision significantly complicates the question of legitimacy. These concerns are further compounded by the absence of any clear timeline for ratifying the constitution, leaving the process open-ended and reinforcing fears that the draft could remain suspended indefinitely, subject to shifting political calculations rather than democratic consent.

The third criticism centers on the draft’s failure to define the territorial boundaries of the Palestinian state, a notable departure from the framework established in the amended Basic Law of 2003, which treated borders as a foundational constitutional principle. This omission is particularly consequential given the relentless expansion of Israeli settlements, alongside increasingly explicit and dangerous official Israeli statements and practices that threaten the future of both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In this context, the absence of any territorial definition is not a neutral technical gap, but a substantive constitutional weakness that risks normalizing an open-ended conception of statehood detached from land, sovereignty, and political geography.

The fourth criticism targets the very premise of producing an “interim executive constitution” for the Palestinian state. If the constitutional framework is, by definition, temporary and executive in nature, the question arises: what purpose does it serve when a provisional yet functional Basic Law already exists and continues to regulate political life? Rather than resolving constitutional ambiguity, the introduction of another interim text risks compounding it, layering temporary arrangements upon one another without addressing the underlying crisis of legitimacy, representation, and political transition.

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The fifth criticism concerns the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between the state that would emerge under this interim constitution and the Palestine Liberation Organization, long recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people. This ambiguity is not new; it has persisted for years. Yet one of the core purposes of any foundational constitutional document should be to decisively clarify, and legally settle, this relationship. The draft, however, leaves the question unresolved, perpetuating a duality of representation and authority at a moment when constitutional clarity is most urgently needed, particularly with respect to the standing and role of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The sixth criticism relates to the codification of the president’s authority to dissolve parliament, as set out in Article 84 of the draft. While the provision formally requires “consultation,” it nonetheless grants the president sweeping power at the expense of the legislature. This imbalance institutionalizes executive dominance and revives one of the central fault lines behind a prolonged political crisis, despite the fact that such authority was never explicitly regulated in this manner under the Basic Law. Rather than correcting a structural defect, the draft risks entrenching it within a new constitutional framework.

The sixth criticism focuses on the position of the vice president, a newly introduced office in the draft constitution. Under the proposed text, the president is granted the authority to appoint and dismiss the vice president, despite the fact that, in principle, both positions should be filled through an electoral process. When this provision is read alongside the second criticism, namely, that adoption of the constitution is tied solely to a presidential decision, with no defined timeline, it opens the door to a highly problematic scenario. Under such conditions, the incumbent vice president could potentially ascend to the presidency on the basis of an appointment decree, effectively bypassing the legitimate and electoral mechanism for the transfer of power envisioned in the draft itself, and hollowing out its own constitutional logic.

The seventh criticism relates to the president’s expansive external powers, as set out in Article 82 of the draft. This provision grants the president the authority to sign and ratify international treaties, a prerogative that significantly complicates, and arguably weakens, the parliament’s oversight role. In systems already marked by executive dominance and fragile legislative institutions, such concentration of foreign-policy authority risks further marginalizing parliamentary scrutiny and entrenching an imbalance of powers at the heart of the constitutional order.

The eighth criticism targets the chapter on the judicial authority, which has drawn particularly sharp scrutiny. Much of the criticism centers on the draft’s failure to abolish the death penalty, as well as provisions that appear to curtail certain public freedoms, most notably trade union rights. Rather than strengthening judicial independence and expanding rights protections in line with contemporary constitutional standards, this section is seen by critics as falling short of both international human rights norms and the expectations of a society that has endured prolonged political and legal exceptionalism.

The ninth criticism concerns the role assigned to the Constitutional Court in declaring a vacancy in the office of the president. This provision is especially contentious given the president’s decisive role in appointing the head of the court. Such an arrangement risks drawing the judiciary directly into the political arena at a critical moment, undermining its neutrality and transforming the court from an arbiter meant to safeguard constitutional order into a party to political contestation. Instead of insulating the judiciary from executive influence, the draft arguably institutionalizes that vulnerability.

The tenth criticism concerns the amendment mechanism set out in Article 155 of the draft constitution. Under this provision, the president is granted primary authority to propose constitutional amendments, while one third of parliament is afforded a parallel, but clearly secondary, right. More critically, the article denies the public the right to vote on constitutional amendments if they are passed by a large parliamentary majority. This arrangement weakens popular sovereignty and places constitutional change firmly within elite political control, contradicting the foundational principle that constitutions derive their legitimacy from the will of the people.

Taken together, these criticisms offer only a partial snapshot of the broader concerns surrounding the draft. Yet they are sufficient to situate it within a wider political context marked by the absence of any clear, time-bound roadmap for holding presidential and legislative elections, or for organizing a popular referendum on the constitution itself. In light of these conditions, it becomes difficult to view the current constitutional initiative as a serious attempt to resolve Palestine’s long-standing constitutional impasse. Instead, it appears more likely that, once again, the drafting of a constitution has been driven primarily by political calculations, rather than by a genuine effort to address the deep-rooted and unresolved constitutional crisis confronting the Palestinian political system.

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