Iraq is approaching a decisive test of its sovereignty. Following the end of the US-led coalition’s military mission in federal Iraq on 30 September 2026, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has set a new deadline of 30 June 2027 for bringing powerful armed factions under state control. The plan begins with a 90-day halt to military activity before moving towards weapons control and the integration of fighters into official security institutions. Yet the refusal of influential factions to surrender their autonomy reveals a deeper problem. Baghdad is attempting to discipline armed organisations that have become embedded in the political order it seeks to reform.

The distinction matters. Iraq is not dealing simply with armed groups operating beyond the reach of the state. Some factions have obtained formal recognition, access to public resources and political influence while retaining organisational interests of their own. Their relationship with the government is therefore more complicated than the conventional distinction between state forces and insurgents.

The withdrawal of American forces offers Baghdad an opportunity to reclaim authority over national security. However, it also removes an external presence that has shaped Iraq’s strategic environment for years. Meanwhile, Iran-aligned factions continue to regard their weapons as instruments of deterrence against the United States and Israel. Their calculations reflect regional rivalries, but also domestic interests that cannot be reduced to instructions from Tehran.

Iraq’s central challenge, therefore, is not merely to collect weapons. It is to dismantle the political, institutional and economic arrangements that allow armed factions to retain independent power within the state. Without that transformation, disarmament could change the appearance of Iraq’s security institutions while leaving their underlying distribution of power largely intact.

Iraq’s central challenge, therefore, is not merely to collect weapons. It is to dismantle the political, institutional and economic arrangements that allow armed factions to retain independent power within the state. Without that transformation, disarmament could change the appearance of Iraq’s security institutions while leaving their underlying distribution of power largely intact.

The Post-2003 State That Empowered Its Own Rivals

The roots of Iraq’s militia problem lie in the political order established after the US-led invasion of 2003. The dismantling of existing state institutions, the restructuring of the security sector and the subsequent struggle over political authority created conditions in which armed organisations could acquire influence beyond the battlefield. The expansion of Islamic State in 2014 accelerated this process. As Iraqi forces struggled to contain the group, the mobilisation of volunteers and existing militias became........

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