There are moments in geopolitics when abstractions collapse into hard reality, and right now we are witnessing one of them. For years, India has spoken the language of strategic autonomy with almost ritualistic confidence. It could buy oil from Russia under Western sanctions, maintain ties with Iran, deepen defence relations with Israel, and still claim a careful, balanced posture in West Asia. It was a neat story. But now, it is being stress-tested in the most unforgiving way possible.

The Strait of Hormuz has ceased to be just a chokepoint on a map. It has become a lever of power. Iran appears to be exercising selective control over maritime traffic, allowing some vessels through while constraining others. Even if one discounts the more speculative claims, including those about payments in Chinese yuan, the underlying shift is undeniable.

Passage is no longer routine. It is discretionary. And discretionary control changes everything. 

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India's exposure here is structural, not incidental. Roughly 40 per cent of its crude imports transit through Hormuz. Overall, India's import dependence stands close to 88 per cent. That is not a vulnerability you can wish away with diplomatic statements, but it is baked into the system. There is, however, a nuance that is often missed.

India is not equally vulnerable across all energy segments. On crude, it has built some resilience. Diversification toward Russian supplies and incremental sourcing from outside the Gulf has given it some manoeuvrability. The government has even indicated that a significant share of current imports is now routed outside Hormuz. But LPG is where the real fault line lies.

India consumes over 30 million tonnes of LPG annually, with imports accounting for roughly 60 per cent of demand. Unlike crude, there is no comparable cushion in terms of strategic reserves or flexible sourcing. When supply chains tighten, the impact is immediate and visible. Not in abstract macroeconomic charts, but in kitchens. That is why the current stress is showing up first as a cooking gas crisis rather than a petrol panic. The state can manage petrol and diesel prices through a mix of taxation, subsidies, and inventory smoothing. LPG is politically more sensitive and logistically less forgiving.

The early signs are already there. Supplies are being prioritised for households. Commercial users are being straitjacketed. Restaurants, small eateries, and catering businesses are being pushed toward alternative fuels. This is how such crises typically unfold. The pain is redistributed, but not eliminated.

If the disruption persists, the second-order effects will be harder to contain. Higher freight costs, insurance premiums, and longer shipping routes will feed into input costs across sectors. Fertilisers, Petrochemicals, transport, and eventually food prices will feel the strain.

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Growth forecasts will be revised downward, not because India cannot find oil, but because it will have to pay significantly more for it. This is where the geopolitical dimension becomes impossible to ignore. Timing matters in diplomacy, and optics matter even more.

The Prime Minister's visit to Israel, just days before the escalation against Iran, may have made sense within the logic of bilateral ties. But in a region as sensitive as West Asia, those consequences are significant. India now finds itself navigating a crisis where it appears, at least superficially, to have leaned too visibly toward one side.

To be clear, India has not been completely shut out by Tehran. There are indications that India-linked vessels have been allowed passage through Hormuz. Communication channels remain open, and this is not a rupture. But it is also not influence. There is a difference between being tolerated and being listened to.

At the moment, India looks more like the former than the latter. A country that truly commands strategic space would not be scrambling to secure safe passage for individual shipments. It would be shaping the conditions under which that passage is negotiated. India is not doing that. It is about managing exposure, not exercising leverage.

A greater danger lies ahead. So far, the crisis has been contained to Hormuz. But West Asia rarely confines itself to neat geographic limits. The Houthis remain a latent variable. If the conflict expands to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb corridor, India's energy lifelines face pressure from both ends.

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Hormuz constrains entry. The Red Sea complicates exit and rerouting. Even partial disruption across both corridors would send shipping costs and insurance premiums soaring. You do not need a complete blockade. A handful of attacks, a few damaged vessels, and the market does the rest. Risk gets priced in brutally and instantly.

For India, that would mean an energy squeeze that is no longer sectoral but systemic. The uncomfortable truth is this. India's claims of strategic autonomy have always rested on a fragile foundation. They worked in a world where major powers were competing but not directly confronting each other at scale. They worked when supply chains could absorb shocks. They work far less well in a world where chokepoints are weaponised and access itself becomes a bargaining chip.

This does not mean India is facing an imminent collapse. It is not. The system has buffers. Russian crude will continue to flow. Alternative suppliers will step in, albeit at a higher cost. Domestic adjustments will buy time. But the margin for error has narrowed sharply.

In the immediate term, India will muddle through. Household LPG supplies will be protected, at least politically. Commercial users will bear the brunt. Prices will creep upward, quietly at first, then more visibly. The government will insist there is no cause for alarm, even as it works behind the scenes to secure additional cargoes from wherever they can be found.

In the medium term, however, the costs will accumulate. Higher import bills, inflationary pressure, fiscal strain, and slower growth. None of these will arrive dramatically, but they will seep in.

And in the long term, this episode will stand as a reminder of something India has preferred not to confront directly. Energy security is not about sourcing oil from different countries. It is about control over routes, storage, and pricing power. It is about having enough leverage that access to energy cannot be turned into a geopolitical instrument against you. India does not have that leverage. Not yet.

For now, it is navigating a narrowing corridor, hoping that the currents do not turn any harsher. In a crisis defined by chokepoints, that is not a comfortable place to be.

The author is a National Award winner for Best Narration and an independent political analyst.

© Mathrubhumi English