Sixty-five years ago, India and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). Brokered by the World Bank, it divided a collection of rivers into two “national” halves. The western rivers flowing from J&K — Chenab, Jhelum, and the Indus — were for Pakistan’s use, while the eastern rivers in Punjab — Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi — were assigned for India’s exclusive utilisation. The divided Indus Basin was to be governed by provisions, restrictions and arbitration mechanisms. In the post-colonial imagination, the Indus and its tributaries were claimed as instruments of nation-building, valued in terms of sovereignty.

The IWT enabled the most complete utilisation of the waters through dams, barrages and canals. Without it, Pakistan would have been constrained to build grand hydraulic works to transfer water from the western rivers to meet its irrigation needs and become independent of the eastern rivers. Likewise, without exclusive access to the eastern rivers, India would have struggled to make the Bhakra and Nangal dams operational and to irrigate 15 million hectares of farmland in Punjab. Projects like the Rajasthan Canal would have faltered, and the Ravi–Beas link canal might never have taken off.

When the Lok Sabha debated the IWT on November 30, 1960, the mood was anything but celebratory. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru faced sharp criticism. One member accused him of acting like “an umpire in a cricket match” whenever India was in dispute, rather than defending the country whose destiny he led. Nehru, true to his temperament, appealed to higher ideals, dismissing what he called the “narrow-minded spirit” of the House.

While the engineers behind the treaty offered........

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