The US’s emergence as the sole superpower after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a strategic shift from conventional warfare to counter-insurgency operations, fostering increased reliance on “exquisite” high-end weaponry. Russia, despite being one of the most heavily sanctioned states, has managed to sustain a large-scale, protracted war since 2022. The contrasting experiences of the US and Russia highlight important lessons for India’s defence preparedness and industrial strategy.

The ongoing war between the United States (US) and Israel with Iran, code-named Operation Epic Fury by the US, has exposed significant weaknesses in the US defence manufacturing base, leading to growing concerns about sustainability in a protracted war. While the US retains overwhelming technological superiority, its ability to sustain high-intensity operations is increasingly constrained by industrial and supply chain limitations.

The US armed forces have expended certain advanced munitions at an extremely rapid rate due to the high tempo of operations, especially in the initial days of the war. According to a report presented to members of the US Congress, the US is estimated to have expended approximately US$ 5.6 billion worth of munitions within the first 48 hours of its military operations against Iran.[i]

A major concern is the rapid depletion of the stockpile of advanced munitions. In a study which tracked 35 munition types after 96 hours of fighting, 21 were found to have a healthy inventory state with ‘mature production lines’, while 14 displayed ‘critical strain’.[ii] The 14 systems that displayed critical strain are part of the US’s credible air defence (AD) and long-range strike capabilities.

Israel too maintained a very high tempo of operations in the initial days of war, expending at a rapid rate certain types of advanced munitions. Among the munitions whose stock has depleted at a very fast pace are Arrow interceptors. The inventory of Arrow interceptors has been reduced by half in the first four days of the war. It will take Israel 32 months, at the current production rates, to replenish its inventory. As regards the US ground-launched Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), the inventory has been reduced by 33 per cent.[iii] In recent years, the US Army has been replacing ATCAMS with PrSM. According to a Defense News report, the army procured 26 PrSM missiles in 2024 and another 54 in 2025, a total of 80 missiles.[iv]

In comparison, the US and Israeli armed forces fired more than 3,000 precision-guided munitions and interceptors in the first 36 hours of the war.[v] Also, in the first 96 hours of the war, eight GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators were used, reportedly a quarter of the inventory, and are not likely to be replenished before 2028.[vi] The figures above indicate limited inventory and constrained production capacity for certain advanced munitions. Replenishing these systems, which President Donald Trump has termed “Exquisite Class Weaponry”,[vii] is slow, and any surge in production, despite best efforts, can take several months and even years to impact supply to the units and formations at war significantly.

The war has also highlighted cost asymmetry: Iran’s reliance on cheaper drones and missile forces the US to expend far more expensive interceptors, accelerating depletion rates. These dynamics turn industrial capacity into a decisive factor, leading to stockpile shortages that could take years to rebuild.

Arthur Herman, in Freedom’s Forge, has underscored a critical reality of war: military power depends not only on battlefield capability but also on the resilience and scalability of defence manufacturing.  He notes that when World War II began, the US lacked the industrial capacity needed to sustain a major war effort. Fortunately, it had not yet entered the war, giving it valuable time to prepare. The country took roughly 18 months or about a year to construct new facilities and retool existing ones, followed by six months for conversion—a luxury no nation at war can afford in today’s time.[viii]

This brief examines the causes of the rapid depletion of advanced munitions in the US inventory during the ongoing war. It analyses how the US’s emergence as the sole superpower after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a strategic shift from conventional warfare to counter-insurgency operations, fostering increased reliance on “exquisite” high-end weaponry. The brief also explores how chronic underinvestment in conventional weapon systems weakened the industrial base, resulting in limited surge production capacity that may take months or even years to scale. Additionally, the issue brief considers how Russia, despite being one of the most heavily sanctioned states, has managed to sustain a large-scale, protracted war since 2022.

Weakening of the Defence Industrial Base

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, President George H.W. Bush and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher popularised the slogan ‘peace dividend’, which described the economic benefits of reducing defence spending.[ix] William Perry, the then deputy defence secretary, presided over 1993’s infamous ‘Last Supper’, where he hosted the CEOs of leading defence firms and warned that declining defence budgets would necessitate consolidation across the industry.[x] Defence spending was reduced by 67 per cent[xi]; as a result, out of the 51 primes[xii] in 1993, there are five today.

Following the end of the Cold War and the swift victory in the Gulf War, decision-makers increasingly assumed that future conflicts would be short, decisive and heavily dependent on advanced technology. The demonstrated effectiveness of precision-guided munitions, stealth platforms, and networked command-and-control systems fostered confidence that wars could be won quickly through overwhelming initial force and information dominance. This outlook encouraged a shift towards high-end, “exquisite” capabilities designed to deliver rapid battlefield effects, while placing less emphasis on stockpiles, redundancy, and the capacity for prolonged, large-scale conventional warfare.

The absence of a credible state adversary and military threat in the early 1990s led to a major drawdown of US military forces in both composition and posture. The significant size reduction is most clearly reflected in the decline of active-duty personnel and major platforms. According to a RAND study, during the period 1990–2018, total US active-duty military personnel reduced from over 2.1 million to over 1.3 million. During the same period, the US Army’s main battle tanks decreased from over 15,000 to approximately 2,000, the total number of navy ships decreased from approximately 600 to 300, and the USAF’s manned combat aircraft decreased from approximately 4,000 to 2,000.[xiii]

In the last three decades, the US shaped its defence-industrial base around the belief that future wars would be short and swift, driven by advanced technology. Influenced by the precision strikes of the Gulf War and the display of technological superiority in Iraq, US planners built a force geared towards conflicts decided by superior sensors, communications and precision targeting rather than protracted conventional wars characterised by high-volume ‘traditional’ firepower and large-scale manpower deployment.[xiv]

Following the launch of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine in 2022, the US and its allies confronted the reality that their defence-industrial base was ill-prepared to sustain the demands of a high-intensity conventional war against a peer adversary. In response, they have begun pursuing systemic efforts to rebuild capacity, expand production, and strengthen resilience in defence manufacturing. Yet, as things stand today, a lot is left to be desired.

As of 2025, the US produced about 40,000 artillery shells per month, an increase of 178 per cent over pre-war levels, yet this output does not meet Ukraine’s rate of consumption.[xv] As of February 2024, Ukraine’s stated minimum requirement was 356,400 shells per month, with a capacity to fire 594,000 per month.[xvi]

The US’ capacity to manufacture ‘Exquisite Class Weaponry’ when compared to the rate of consumption is equally concerning. In 2025, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon produced approximately 740 Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3 missiles, with plans to increase production to 1,100 by 2027.[xvii] In the first 36 hours of Operation Epic Fury, Iran fired over 1,000 munitions across West Asia. In response, US, Israeli and allied forces fired more than 3,000 precision-guided munitions and interceptors.[xviii]

Assumption of Short, Swift Wars

The erosion of the US industrial base reflects the combined effects of the Pentagon’s procurement policies, premised on the........

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