The balancing China question before India
The October 21 agreement between India and China focusing on disengagement and the resumption of pre-2020 patrolling patterns in the flashpoint areas of Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh is indeed a welcome development. The agreement marks a major milestone in the disengagement process between the two nations. The agreement takes care of much of the border contestation that started in the summer of 2020, but not all of it. While any border deal with China is good, “any deal” with China also harbours the danger of creating undesirable fait accomplis and feeds Beijing’s habit of nibbling away at Indian territory.
Last year’s October deal is largely viewed as a temporary reprieve in the relationship between the two neighbours, rather than a restoration of the status quo ante bellum that existed before the 2020 border standoff. It is an imperfect deal, in that sense. But that doesn’t take away from the fact that we needed this temporary breather, as getting bogged down with China on the border is not in our strategic interest. If this agreement is indeed a temporary reprieve, we can expect to see more skirmishes and standoffs, coupled with a persistent reluctance from China to engage in a negotiated settlement of the border dispute with India. This is purely a function of growing Chinese power, how it sees itself and sees India compared to itself: China, to paraphrase Thucydides, seeks to do what it can and expects India to suffer........
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