The war in West Asia has brought into focus not only the geopolitics and geoeconomics of the region but also the internal political dynamics of Iran. The study of the state, political culture, and social structure remains central to understanding how strategies of war and peace are formulated across the world. In political science literature, we frequently encounter the adages “all politics is local” and “all geopolitics is local.” These suggest that native culture, economic conditions, and social structures significantly influence a state’s external behaviour. This article seeks to reflect on the internal dynamics of politics in Iran.

The study of political culture in any region or country is essential for understanding its people and their political behaviour. In textbook terms, political culture refers to the attitudes and beliefs about politics and governance shared by a group of people. Understanding political culture is crucial for comprehending how a political system functions and how the relationship between the state and its citizens evolves.

With the rise of the Safavid state in the 16th century and its declaration of Shi’ism as the official state doctrine, Shiite traditions and values became central to Iran’s cultural and social identity. It is widely acknowledged that Shiite worldview is shaped by the doctrinal belief in the emergence of Imam Mahdi. For over fourteen centuries, Shiite political culture has centred on the figure of Imam Hussein, whose martyrdom at the hands of external forces became a foundational narrative. Within this framework, the assassination of a supreme leader does not merely eliminate a political figure; it generates a powerful symbolic event capable of reinforcing the regime’s core identity. On March 1, 2026 the government of Iran officially declared that “the supreme leader Ali Khamenei drank the sweet, pure draft of martyrdom and joined the supreme Heavenly kingdom”.

The American historian Barbara Tuchman argued that the “United States might have fared better in Vietnam war had it focused less on geography and more on local dynamics”. U.S. policymakers underestimated the power of nationalism in Vietnam, as they later did in Afghanistan. Similarly, the Greek historian Thucydides identified honour as a key cause of conflict between states. A central tragedy of our time is that foreign policy increasingly appears influenced by individuals and groups pursuing sectional interests rather than broader goals of international harmony and regional stability. The Trump administration has yet to articulate a coherent theory of victory in West Asia. Drawing from these worldwide frustrations journalist Prabhu Chawla has argued that Indian foreign policy has become insulated from domestic political realities and overly aligned with a pro-West orientation. He suggests that bureaucratic precision has created an echo chamber disconnected from real power dynamics. According to this critique, even extensive diplomatic engagement has not always translated into strategic effectiveness.

Nature of the Iranian State

In his Prison Notebooks, the Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci compared the modern state to a system of fortifications or trench system where the coercive apparatus represents only the “outermost ditch” behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks. He described integral state as political plus civil society. In this sense, civil society enables the state to endure crises by legitimising its authority. A similar form of structural interlocking can be observed in the evolution of the contemporary Iranian state. The Iranian state has evolved through a series of formative experiences that shaped its institutional structure, including the 1953 Iranian coup d’état against Mosaddeq regime, post-1979 international isolation, and the presence of U.S. military bases in neighbouring Gulf states. These factors have contributed significantly to its strategic orientation and rebuilding of the state. The state has been structured to withstand leadership decapitation—a strategy aimed at crippling command structures by targeting leadership. The armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran include the ‘Artesh’ which functions as the conventional military, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is tasked with safeguarding the ideological foundations of the state. At the executive level, the temporal authority of the President operates alongside the spiritual authority of the Supreme Leader. The elected Majlis is further balanced by the ‘Guardian Council’. The Iranian society too has classes linked to power centres. One is country’s small merchants or bazaaris who control traditional economy. The trade unions and guilds have influence over energy and transportation sectors. Against this backdrop we need to weigh two reflections.

Contemporary Reflections

Two key reflections emerge regarding the contemporary Iranian state. First is the argument that conflict in the region may be inevitable. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once stated that Iran must decide whether it seeks to remain a cause or a nation. An ideologically driven, anti-status-quo state with regional ambitions or to focus on its own security and development. His observation referred to Iran’s support for groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shia factions in Iraq, as well as its backing of the Assad regime in Syria. Similarly, in 2005, King Abdullah II of Jordan warned of the emergence of a “Shiite crescent” in the Middle East. In 2016, Barack Obama suggested that Saudi Arabia and Iran could jointly balance regional power.

The second reflection is that diplomatic pathways remain viable and should not be abandoned. Some voices within the United States advocate engaging Iran through diplomacy and mediation, treating it as a nation rather than an ideological cause. Some experts describe Iran as a civilizational state. Prior to recent escalations, mediation efforts—particularly those facilitated by Oman—indicated that agreements were within reach. On February 27, Omani Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi suggested that a deal was close. However, as in previous instances, diplomacy was overtaken by force. The Iranian leadership continues to emphasise the need to build trust to facilitate dialogue and mediation. Decades ago, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kenneth Galbraith, and C. Wright Mills warned of the unwarranted influence of the military-industrial complex as a danger to democracy. Mars the powerful Roman god of war is dancing with rise in militarism. We are losing post-cold war peace dividend.

Many of the challenges in West Asia stem from the isolation of the Iranian regime. Over time, scepticism and mistrust have become embedded in Iran’s political culture, shaping its interactions with the international community. Following the Iranian Revolution, this distrust intensified, contributing to Iran’s exclusion from global trading and capitalist systems. As a result, Iran lacks significant commercial stakes in regional economic hubs such as Dubai, Doha, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi—cities that have, at times, come under threat in regional tensions. The presence of U.S. military bases in the Arab Gulf has further deepened this mistrust. Peace-making is essential for the region and the world. The mediation mechanism must remain embedded in structured negotiations, clarity of interests and enforceable guarantees. As a classic song from the 1970s by Barrett Strong and Norman Whitfield famously put it: “War… what is it good for? Absolutely nothing.”

Prof. Gull Mohmmad Wani is Kashmir based political Scientist

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