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Israel’s Lebanon Strategy Is Self-Defeating

21 0
14.05.2026

There is a paradoxical claim at the heart of Israeli policy toward Lebanon, one that has become so routine that it goes almost unnoticed. Israel insists, correctly, that the Lebanese state must disarm Hezbollah and assert sovereign control over its own territory. It then does everything within its considerable power to ensure that the Lebanese state cannot do so—impeding U.S. military assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), attacking the infrastructure of governance, and hobbling the one international force mandated to support Lebanese authority in the south.

Having helped engineer the conditions for Lebanese failure, Israel contends that the Lebanese cannot handle it themselves. Israel must handle it for them. It is a policy that simultaneously demands a formidable outcome and incapacitates the only plausible instrument for achieving it.

There is a paradoxical claim at the heart of Israeli policy toward Lebanon, one that has become so routine that it goes almost unnoticed. Israel insists, correctly, that the Lebanese state must disarm Hezbollah and assert sovereign control over its own territory. It then does everything within its considerable power to ensure that the Lebanese state cannot do so—impeding U.S. military assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), attacking the infrastructure of governance, and hobbling the one international force mandated to support Lebanese authority in the south.

Having helped engineer the conditions for Lebanese failure, Israel contends that the Lebanese cannot handle it themselves. Israel must handle it for them. It is a policy that simultaneously demands a formidable outcome and incapacitates the only plausible instrument for achieving it.

That this is a self-defeating strategy does not mean Israel’s underlying strategic objective is illegitimate. If Canada were harboring a heavily armed militant movement, funded and equipped by a distant power with no shared border with the United States but a determined interest in killing Americans, Washington would not be overly concerned about Canadian sovereignty, and it would use every instrument at its disposal to destroy the threat.

This is roughly Israel’s position vis-à-vis Hezbollah, and it is essential to keep that symmetry in mind, particularly in the immediate aftermath of Oct. 7, 2023, and the group’s subsequent, if largely performative, solidarity campaign on Hamas’s behalf. During the first weeks, Hezbollah used rockets, mortars, anti-tank guided missiles, sniping, drones, and attacks on Israeli surveillance systems. The exchanges were persistent but mostly contained near the border. Israel evacuated many northern communities, while Lebanese civilians in the south also began leaving border villages.

Then-Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s first major speech after Oct. 7, on Nov. 3, 2023, clarified the posture. He said the Hamas assault was “100 percent Palestinian,” while Hezbollah’s front would continue and could escalate depending on Gaza and Israeli actions toward Lebanon. By then, Hezbollah and Israel had been exchanging fire since Oct. 8, more than 55 Hezbollah fighters had been killed, and Hezbollah had still used only a fraction of its arsenal.

Hezbollah is not merely a Lebanese militia with a grudge but the cornerstone of Iran’s deterrence architecture against Israel, supported........

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