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Last week, NATO began its annual Steadfast Noon exercise to ensure the alliance’s nuclear readiness, even as the Trump administration pursues a policy that threatens to undermine it.

Launched in February, NATO 3.0 is the brainchild of Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of defense for policy. At its core is the assumption that the United States can rapidly wind down its conventional commitments to Europe while retaining its leading role in the alliance, so long as Europe continues to rely on the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Colby presents this shift as a rebalancing of the alliance, enticing European states to take responsibility for the continent’s conventional defense as Washington turns its attention to the Indo-Pacific.

Last week, NATO began its annual Steadfast Noon exercise to ensure the alliance’s nuclear readiness, even as the Trump administration pursues a policy that threatens to undermine it.

Launched in February, NATO 3.0 is the brainchild of Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of defense for policy. At its core is the assumption that the United States can rapidly wind down its conventional commitments to Europe while retaining its leading role in the alliance, so long as Europe continues to rely on the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Colby presents this shift as a rebalancing of the alliance, enticing European states to take responsibility for the continent’s conventional defense as Washington turns its attention to the Indo-Pacific.

The approach is Washington’s attempt to have it both ways—to cut back without sacrificing its influence or affecting extended nuclear deterrence. In reality, however, it would compromise Europe’s defense, diminish Washington’s sway, weaken the U.S. nuclear guarantee, and generate proliferation risks—ultimately undercutting the policy’s objectives and U.S. national interests.

Colby’s vision is already reshaping the U.S. footprint in Europe. In May, the Department of Defense announced plans to withdraw roughly 5,000 troops from Germany and cancel the deployment of a long-range strike battalion there. The U.S. rotational brigade in Romania returned home without replacement last October, and reports suggest another 25,000 to 40,000 troops could leave Europe.

Washington has also proposed cutting its contribution to the NATO Force Model—the pool of forces made available for NATO operations—by one-third to one-half. The United States is reportedly planning to significantly reduce the aircraft and warships available in a crisis, including an aircraft carrier, reconnaissance aircraft, dozens of F-16 and F-15E jets, and potentially half of the current U.S. armed MQ-9 drone supply currently in Europe.

As conventional forces recede, nuclear forces are expected to play a larger role. Colby has pledged Washington “will continue to provide the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent,” and there are reports that the United States is considering expanding the basing of dual-capable aircraft and the deployment of nuclear warheads beyond the alliance’s current six host countries, potentially to Poland and the Baltic states. According to two anonymous sources cited by the Financial Times, the additional nuclear presence is meant to demonstrate the resilience of the U.S. nuclear umbrella despite the conventional drawdown.

Yet convincing an adversary that the U.S. president would risk New York to save Riga has always been a tall order. Historically, Washington has bolstered the credibility of that commitment by ensuring that a conventional attack on NATO territory could trigger unpredictable nuclear escalation. U.S. troops in........

© Foreign Policy