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Although the conflict in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz is far from over, analysts are already rushing to declare what lessons should be learned from it. An emerging genre of security policy articles highlights the various logistical and tactical shortcomings of the U.S. operation against Iran: a lack of preparation for disruptions in oil and fertilizer shipping, insufficient magazine depth in precision munitions and interceptors, a general failure to prepare effectively to counter cheap one-way attack drones, insufficient minesweepers, and so on.

These are useful lessons that may help the United States prepare for future conflicts, but they are not the fundamental cause of the country’s failure in the Strait of Hormuz. Even if some or all of these concerns had been addressed long before the conflict, it is hard to see how they might alter the Trump administration’s failure to achieve its initial war aims of regime change, the destruction of Iran’s long-range strike capability, or major alterations in Iranian policy toward nuclear weapons and regional proxies.

Although the conflict in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz is far from over, analysts are already rushing to declare what lessons should be learned from it. An emerging genre of security policy articles highlights the various logistical and tactical shortcomings of the U.S. operation against Iran: a lack of preparation for disruptions in oil and fertilizer shipping, insufficient magazine depth in precision munitions and interceptors, a general failure to prepare effectively to counter cheap one-way attack drones, insufficient minesweepers, and so on.

These are useful lessons that may help the United States prepare for future conflicts, but they are not the fundamental cause of the country’s failure in the Strait of Hormuz. Even if some or all of these concerns had been addressed long before the conflict, it is hard to see how they might alter the Trump administration’s failure to achieve its initial war aims of regime change, the destruction of Iran’s long-range strike capability, or major alterations in Iranian policy toward nuclear weapons and regional proxies.

While greater magazine depth and preparedness for oil shortages might have enabled a longer bombing campaign or a greater degree of economic pressure, that is no reason to suppose that seven months of bombing or blockade might achieve what nearly six........

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