Can Washington Afford to Deter Chinese Cyber Activity?
In August, the U.S. Justice Department and the FBI dismantled the online infrastructure behind two hacking platforms operated by a Chinese state-sponsored group. It had been targeting sensitive U.S. government networks since at least 2018. In October, the agencies seized hacking tools used by another such group whose operations the U.S. government had previously disrupted in 2024.
Washington can deny Beijing’s hackers access to harmful capabilities. But the longevity and resurgence of the hackers’ campaigns raise a hard truth: Disruption alone cannot reverse the strategic advantages generated by years of Chinese cyber activity.
In August, the U.S. Justice Department and the FBI dismantled the online infrastructure behind two hacking platforms operated by a Chinese state-sponsored group. It had been targeting sensitive U.S. government networks since at least 2018. In October, the agencies seized hacking tools used by another such group whose operations the U.S. government had previously disrupted in 2024.
Washington can deny Beijing’s hackers access to harmful capabilities. But the longevity and resurgence of the hackers’ campaigns raise a hard truth: Disruption alone cannot reverse the strategic advantages generated by years of Chinese cyber activity.
The conventional U.S. approach to cyber deterrence has treated Chinese operations as individual security incidents. But to deter China from accruing advantages through cyber activity, the United States must change the incentives of a vast hacking ecosystem built around the Chinese state in order to counteract its impacts on the United States’ military, technology, and trade.
A shift is now underway in Washington. In March, the U.S. government’s 2026 Cyber Strategy promised sustained and aggressive action through public-private partnerships, which would combine offensive and defensive capabilities with economic and legal countermeasures. Recent reports from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Britain’s Royal United Services Institute similarly advocate for coordinating cyber operations with other instruments of state power.
Such proposals appear to recognize that disrupting individual operations has not changed China’s broader cyber behavior. But while combining instruments may help disrupt individual operations and parts of the ecosystem, they may still fail to credibly deter the broader pattern of activity that generates cumulative advantage.
Therein lies the more troubling possibility: that the United States cannot credibly deter the broad pattern of Chinese cyber activity at a price that it is prepared—or willing—to sustain.
China’s recent cyber campaigns have advantages beyond individual intrusions. In 2023, for example, the........
