Understanding the conflict three years on.

More on this topic

On Sept. 28, Moldovan voters overwhelmingly rejected pro-Russian parties and gave President Maia Sandu’s pro-European party a decisive parliamentary majority. The victory, which came despite a massive Russia-financed influence operation to sway the election, was only the latest in a series of geopolitical setbacks for Moscow.

Contrary to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chest-thumping bravado, he has done enormous damage to Russia’s regional and global interests since launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Indeed, Putin’s policies make no sense in terms of realist theory of state behavior. They can only be explained by various assumptions regarding what motivates specific leaders to act the way they do.

On Sept. 28, Moldovan voters overwhelmingly rejected pro-Russian parties and gave President Maia Sandu’s pro-European party a decisive parliamentary majority. The victory, which came despite a massive Russia-financed influence operation to sway the election, was only the latest in a series of geopolitical setbacks for Moscow.

Contrary to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chest-thumping bravado, he has done enormous damage to Russia’s regional and global interests since launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Indeed, Putin’s policies make no sense in terms of realist theory of state behavior. They can only be explained by various assumptions regarding what motivates specific leaders to act the way they do.

The roster of Russian setbacks is long. The most dramatic, of course, has occurred in Ukraine, where Moscow could once count on a large Russia-friendly segment of the population. However, Putin’s invasion and annexation of Crimea in 2014, his instigation of violent separatist movements, and his brutal occupation policies in the Moscow-controlled regions turned public opinion in Ukraine’s Russian-speaking east and south against Russia. Today, the shift has become deeply rooted, especially given the war crimes and massive loss of life perpetrated by Russia in three and a half years of war.

When the war ends, Russia will face a heavily armed Ukraine whose population will be welded together for generations by the wounds of Russia’s aggression. A powerful Ukrainian military made up of skilled and seasoned fighters and enhanced by innovative weapons and tactics will work in concert with Europe to deter the Russian threat and limit Russian influence in Europe.

By any standard, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also significantly reduced Russia’s ability to project power in what is sees as its traditional sphere of influence. Not only has the war sapped Russia’s military hardware and created deep-seated problems for its economy, its military occupation and annexation of Ukrainian territory have also eroded most of Moscow’s influence among the states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet empire.

The Commonwealth of Independent States—once Russia’s main instrument for the peaceful reintegration of the post-Soviet states—is in shambles. The Eurasian Economic Union, which Russia created a little over a decade ago as an alternative to the European Union, has been reduced to a minor trading bloc with a stable membership of only four states: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Though Armenia is still a formal member, the country’s parliament officially endorsed accession to the European Union in February, prompting Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk to warn of serious economic consequences for........

© Foreign Policy