As the strategic rivalry between China and the United States intensifies across the Indo-Pacific, the Taiwan Strait is often seen as the key flash point. Yet whether the regional balance holds or tips into conflict will also be shaped by choices made in, by, and about the Pacific Islands—the 12 sovereign states and several territories whose archipelagos stretch across the vast ocean between the Philippines and Hawaii.

Since the first decade of this century, China has steadily expanded its presence across the region. Most Pacific governments have leaned in to Beijing’s offerings—seeking infrastructure and investment, as well as the leverage that Chinese ties give them with other partners. At the same time, they have worked to preserve their own autonomy and advance a “Blue Pacific” vision of a peaceful and cohesive regional order. But as China’s influence deepens and the islands’ democratic institutions come under growing pressure, that vision risks being eclipsed.

Under the first Trump administration and the Biden administration, the United States belatedly recognized that, left unchecked, Chinese influence could erode governance and eventually turn some island nations into client states of Beijing. Over time, it could split regional consensus, deprive Taiwan of diplomatic allies, and complicate Western deterrence in the Pacific. To counter this dynamic, both administrations began a reengagement with the region, and the Biden administration launched a government-wide Pacific Partnership Strategy and pledged $1 billion in assistance over ten years.

Since then, however, the second Trump administration has taken steps that many Pacific leaders see as disregarding their countries’ interests. With the shuttering of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the islands lost USAID’s regional mission in Fiji, which oversaw programs across all 12 Pacific Island countries. The administration has also frozen tens of millions of dollars in U.S. foreign aid to the region. Other Western allies in the region have tried to fill the gap—including Australia, which has reallocated $77 million to the Pacific. But that will not be enough to counterbalance Beijing.

Meanwhile, the United States has imposed across-the-board tariffs of ten to 15 percent on Pacific nations such as Fiji, Vanuatu, and Nauru. And the administration’s dismissal of climate change flies in the face of the priorities of islanders, who regard it as an existential threat—particularly those in low-lying atoll countries such as Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu.

For now, the Pacific Islands have mostly sought to avoid explicit alignment with either China or the United States and its partners. At this year’s Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting in September—an annual gathering of island countries and territories together with Australia and New Zealand—the host nation, Solomon Islands, broke with tradition and did not invite any nonmembers. The immediate reason was to avoid controversy over Taiwan’s participation, which China opposes as part of a persistent campaign to deprive Taipei of diplomatic recognition and relevance. But a larger consideration was China’s own expanding presence in the region, which has, in turn, encouraged the United States and other powers to treat the islands more as strategic assets than as sovereign partners.

In a bid to manage this trend, the forum announced new rules on island partnerships with outside powers and made a formal declaration to keep the region free from militarization and external coercion. But to make these ideals a reality, Western partners will need to do more to help the islands protect their democratic institutions and defend their sovereignty. For the United States and its allies, it will be imperative to find new ways to address the islands’ priorities and concerns, even as they seek to balance China.

In the late twentieth century, Pacific Island countries and territories aligned with and relied on former colonial overlords. As they achieved independence or at least greater self-rule, they built a multilateral regional order centered on the Pacific Islands Forum, established in 1971 to coordinate policies and elevate Pacific voices. Over time, this cooperative framework helped the islands chart their own destinies, alongside broad partnerships with Western governments. After the Cold War ended, however, Western strategic interest in the islands waned: aid declined, diplomatic representation thinned, and high-level engagement became sporadic.

Against this background, most Pacific Islands have........

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