A specter is haunting Russia—the specter of succession. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is 73 years old, has built a powerful personalist regime, but one that has no real plan for what comes next. Putin will eventually leave office, whether by death, illness, or—against all observable inclinations—stepping aside. But what happens then is unclear. It could be a rushed passing of the guard, a chaotic power struggle among elites long denied the highest political offices, or continued decay under the gerontocracy that currently runs the country alongside Russia’s dictator.

Regime succession in Russia is therefore more than just a question of Putin himself. It is also about the eventual passing of an entire generation of elites who surround the Russian autocrat and still cling to most of the highest positions in the state. Many figures close enough to power to influence the choice of the next leader are as old as Putin is. Their own departure from the political scene is critical, because they still disproportionately control the institutions that determine who matters when succession eventually takes place.

Putin’s tight-knit network has helped him consolidate power and maintain regime stability. Yet the system that has kept these reliable allies in office has also excluded subsequent generations from participating in high politics, gaining trust from other powerholders, and learning leadership skills that they would need to effectively govern in the future. By preventing natural generational turnover, Putin’s system has created such a blockage that much younger generations—including the relatives of current elites in Putin’s inner circle—may leapfrog officials currently in their 50s and 60s who picture themselves as the autocrat’s natural heirs. As Russia’s highest elites age alongside Putin, there is no guarantee they will be able to manage a succession process or prevent the long-delayed ambitions of their younger colleagues from escalating into internal conflict.

Russia’s succession process will flow through the country’s formally democratic constitutional architecture, which requires a transitional election within three months of the president leaving office. But the constitution does not determine who can position themselves to win that election or who will eventually emerge as Russia’s next leader. Instead, as was the case during the political transition in the Soviet Union after the death of Joseph Stalin, the decisions and dealmaking of a small cohort of insiders will determine who takes charge.

What is distinct now is that many of the analogous power brokers and contenders for leadership today are significantly older than the candidates to succeed Stalin were, which suggests that they may not have the energy or lucidity to manage a contested succession. If Putin’s graying allies are still in place when he departs the presidency, they will have missed an opportunity to train a new elite generation and ensure a peaceful transition, just as Putin has missed an opportunity to groom his own successor.

RECIPE FOR SUCCESSION

Putin has consistently decided against designating a successor or institutionalizing a clear process for choosing one. United Russia, the country’s nominal ruling party, was never built to designate an heir; rather, it was meant to ensure that elections produced reliably pro-regime seat-fillers in institutions such as parliament. Russia’s constitution also excludes a position of vice president, which avoids forcing the leader to dub a chosen inheritor.

According to the constitution, if the presidential office becomes vacant, the prime minister will become acting president until an election is held. But Putin has carefully chosen prime ministers who do not have a strong power base and cannot overshadow him. This also means that they are not obvious successors. The current prime minister, Mikhail Mishustin, for example, lacks his own network of loyal supporters, meaning that if he were to become acting president he would struggle to convert his position into a victory in a presidential election.

Putin’s only experiment in potential succession, when he endorsed Dmitry........

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