Last month, the Trump administration announced the start of the second phase of its Gaza peace plan, which the UN Security Council endorsed in November. Phase one, which went into effect last October, produced an initial cease-fire and ultimately the return of all hostages alive and dead, the release of about 2,000 Palestinian prisoners, and the resumption of humanitarian aid. Phase two mandates the creation of a technocratic Palestinian governing authority, the deployment of an international stabilization force, the disarmament of Hamas, the reconstruction of Gaza, and the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces. The success of phase two will depend on the disarmament of Hamas. If there is disarmament, there will be reconstruction and Israeli withdrawal. Without it, there will be neither. The success of phase two hinges on the answer to a central question: Can the conditions that produced years of terrorism and war truly be dismantled?

At present, there are effectively two Gazas that must be unified before a durable peace can take hold. Israel maintains control of what is known as the Green Zone, which is roughly 53 percent of the territory and is largely in the east. Hamas controls the so-called Red Zone, the remaining 47 percent, primarily in the western part of the strip. In a statement issued in October, Hamas formally agreed to “hand over the administration of the Gaza Strip to a Palestinian body of independent technocrats,” but it is far from clear that the group will lay down its arms and allow Gazans to build a future it does not dominate. Achieving that outcome will require multiple actors, led by the United States, to use their leverage.

U.S. President Donald Trump must make clear to three countries in particular—Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey—that they are expected to deliver disarmament or risk damaging their relationships with Washington. The heads of state of all three countries have joined Trump’s Board of Peace and endorsed his Gaza peace plan. Each has influence over Hamas’s finances, legitimacy, political standing, and internal cohesion. Together, they have the power to pressure Hamas to begin decommissioning its weapons. They can publicly condemn the group for blocking the reconstruction of Gaza, and they can threaten to deny its leaders the ability to continue operating in their countries.

If a process of disarmament takes hold, Trump’s peace plan, including a pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, will begin to look less aspirational and more realistic. That may seem implausible today, but successful implementation of phase two would fundamentally alter the psychological and political landscape for both the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Conversely, if Hamas chooses not to disarm and Gaza does not reunify, the future looks bleak. At best, the territory will remain partitioned, with Gazans living under Hamas’s tyranny or Israeli occupation. At worst, Gaza will once again become a war zone.

UN Security Council Resolution 2803 gives the Board of Peace exclusive authority over the governance of Gaza for the next two years, with the possibility of extension. The Board of Peace’s executive committee will work closely with the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, which is made up of 15 Palestinian technocrats. The NCAG will manage day-to-day governance in........

© Foreign Affairs