The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of the Philippines on Wednesday rejected China’s claim of sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea, saying this contradicts China’s claim to be a peace-loving nation which respects the principles of international law. “The DFA statement is an open challenge to China’s claim to be a peace-loving nation which observes the principles of international law,” the DFA said in a statement late Wednesday.

The DFA said China’s claim of sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea “contradicts China’s image of a peace-loving nation which respects the principles of international law.” The DFA’s rejection of China’s sovereignty claim over disputed areas of the South China Sea shows that smaller countries such as the Philippines are still in a long and difficult struggle to enforce international law in the face of pressure from stronger nations.

The Philippines’ territorial claim over part of the South China Sea is based on a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling that invalidated China’s nine-dash line claim to the area and confirmed the country’s sovereign rights to Scarborough Shoal and Thitu Island. China rejected the ruling and has been engaging in activities incompatible with the ruling while describing itself as a “benevolent” power that respects the sovereignty of all other countries, at the same time that it is acting in a way that is incompatible with that characterisation of itself.

China’s actions speak louder than its words. The construction of artificial islands and the bullying of Philippine, Vietnamese and Malaysian vessels and ships are in clear breach of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. China’s rejection of the principles of the convention by imposing its own exclusive interpretation of the rights and interests of other parties while disregarding the legitimate decisions of other parties also raises several questions. Can China still call itself a member of the UN that respects the principle of respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity as stipulated in the Preamble to the UN Charter? Can China still be regarded as a peace-loving member state that has a legitimate place as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council? The Filipino government’s decision to reject China’s offer also reinforces the view that China can no longer be regarded as a peace-loving state.

A host of challenges still lie ahead. Expect more reports of encounters between Chinese warships and the Philippine navy using water cannons to deter them. The risk of the standoff escalating and affecting regional stability remains real. The key to all this is how the Philippines can sustain its growing relations with the US, Japan and Australia while it continues to be heavily dependent on China economically. The alternative is that the country has to downplay its relations with the four and be more conciliatory towards China’s position on the disputed areas. Such an approach would only serve to undermine Philippine sovereignty and undermine the growing morale of the Armed Forces in its new role as a modern and capable fighting force. Aquino’s China policy has already become a huge embarrassment for the country. China has rebuffed the President’s stance on the disputed areas, and what has transpired is that the Philippines has alone protested China’s stance. While ASEAN as a whole remains divided over China  Cambodia and Laos, China’s two closest allies in the organisation, have blocked a joint ASEAN statement on China’s intransigence, while the others like Vietnam and Malaysia while wary of China’s increasingly assertive and unilateral approach to the disputes lack the political will to challenge China directly the Philippines as the country in conflict with China at the moment has to carry on alone in its opposition to China’s stance.

Solving the West Philippine Sea issue would really require a lot of effort and patience, and that is why it is very important to mention the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arbitral Ruling every time the West Philippine Sea is discussed. We need to continue to strengthen our defence cooperation with our friends and partners in two main ways: to prevent war and to prevent aggression. Activities that can reinforce our defence cooperation can range from joint military exercises and intelligence sharing, capacity building for our armed forces, as well as other defence and security activities aimed at strengthening our defence systems to prevent any form of aggression that may occur in our territory. The Code of Conduct that ASEAN is currently finalising should be binding in character and in the form of concrete provisions to serve as the basis for the behaviour of all states concerned with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea. It would not be easy, but it is attainable if we continuously and persuasively push for ASEAN to agree and endorse the Code of Conduct. We need to further improve our economic relations with Japan, South Korea, India and the European Union, among others, to address our increasing heavy dependence on China as our major economic partner, and at the same time gain access to new and lucrative markets for our products and services. These countries have acceptable trading terms that would not erode our country’s economic sovereignty. We need to internationalise China, show the world its many faces and expose its many contradictions. And at the end of it all, it is the principle of sovereignty enshrined in the UNCLOS that stands in the way of China’s attempts to assert its hegemony over the South China Sea and impose its will on all other nations based on its unilateral interpretation of history and law.

The Philippines’ rejection of China’s claim to a part of the South China Sea is an important wake-up call. It should be used to campaign for the rules of the international law of the sea, to demonstrate their validity in practice and to test their strength if they are deliberately disregarded. The case shows that the enforcement of these rules will probably always entail difficulties, risks, political trade-offs and challenges within the context of ASEAN. However, alternative models, including rule-based cooperation and diverse forms of regional cooperation, are also possible. The Philippines’ rejection of China’s claim can be seen as an important act in defence of the Philippines’ sovereignty and as a clear affirmation of the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-preponderance, i.e. that even smaller states can reject and resist unilateral uses of power by more powerful states. It remains to be seen whether this principle will be a stable component of the South China Sea’s security equation, or if the region will succumb to a struggle of wills in which illegal claims and behaviour come to prevail, and the South China Sea turns into a region of disputed maritime zones, where unregulated competition and potential conflict prevail.

China’s image as a peace-loving country is under increasing scrutiny. China, as a global power, must live up to its image of being a responsible power by its words and actions. A principle of respecting the sovereignty of other countries must be adhered to in its totality and not on a selective basis. It is inconsistent for a country to champion the cause of peace while practising coercion at the same time. In this regard, the Philippines’ move to stand up for the principle of justice may well mark a major watershed in the region towards achieving a more stable and rule-based security order in the Asia-Pacific.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Chen, F. (2026). South China Sea expert warns 2026 code of conduct is ‘simply not achievable’. South China Morning Post. 

Chen, F., & Zhou, L. (2026). The Philippines wants to seal the South China Sea code of conduct. Can it deliver? South China Morning Post

© Eurasia Review