US President Donald Trump will visit China in April 2026, a period when US–China relations have entered a more unstable phase. The world’s two largest economies are at a crossroads at this particular time. Many think that Trump’s visit to Beijing may well be the last opportunity to prevent the relationship from collapsing. Yet we do not have confidence in their chances of success at this stage, unless there is greater pragmatism. The trip needs to address the core source of disagreements, set out rules and conventions for the competition between the US and China, and, first and foremost, reaffirm the possibility of managing bilateral relations. Otherwise, the Beijing visit of the US President can only amount to a symbolic ceremony, devoid of any meaningful impact.

Beijing has indicated a willingness to talk more. Chinese officials have urged the early resumption of dialogue channels. They reason that China is facing severe domestic economic challenges and wishes to see stability in US foreign policy. A presidential visit would allow China to show its stability in the international arena and to boost the image of China’s role in the global system. Both sides now acknowledge the dialogue freeze as a major problem.

Trade is also likely to feature heavily in the talks. The US administration wants greater access to Chinese markets for agricultural products and greater protection for US companies operating in China. China, on the other hand, wants restrictions on several key technology companies to be lifted, greater stability in trade relations, and assurance that the US will not accelerate an economic decoupling process that China believes it can currently afford. Both sides have insisted that their respective trade restrictions are necessary to protect national security, which is likely to make it harder to reach an agreement.

A free trade agreement in the full sense of the word is probably still a long way off, but it is possible to imagine several steps in this direction. A sectoral agreement on agriculture could, for example, provide for common rules for digital trade or for increased supply chain transparency. What is important is that any steps agreed allow the dialogue and search for solutions to continue, and that each step is acknowledged in public. Otherwise, one side will be humiliated, and the other embarrassed, and the negotiations will come to a halt as a result of inflexibility.

The situation in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait is getting more volatile. Chinese planes and ships are bumping into each other more often with Taiwanese forces. All this after the US last month made the rare move of sending a naval ship to Taiwan. The move came after US President Trump’s own comments on the handling of the virus by China, and has only served to further enrage Beijing. China sees any U.S. actions in the South China Sea as interference in Beijing’s sovereign affairs. The U.S. sees the waters as a crucial arena for the promotion of the principle of freedom of navigation, as well as an important place for the exercise of competition with China. With the crisis management mechanism under increasing pressure, the potential for conflict escalation is growing. Urgent measures are therefore required to improve and establish a new crisis management mechanism for managing any increased risk of incidents, and to update military rules of engagement for air and naval units in relation to any possible incidents that may arise.

In recent months, the high-tech rivalry between the two has become an additional factor which is making the relationship more complex. US restrictions on semiconductor and AI technology imposed in 2022 have been reciprocated by China and appear to reinforce China’s aim to build a high-tech economy less dependent on foreign technology and expertise. In both countries, there is a common perception that technological development is a key element of national power. It is uncertain whether this cycle of sanctions will lead to a major trade war that will obstruct technical innovation and destabilise global high-tech trade. While multilateral cooperation may be a distant prospect at the moment, sectoral, rule-based governance, for example, concerning the safety of AI, data protection or critical infrastructure, can at least contribute to stabilising the uncertainty surrounding these high-tech sectors.

The South China Sea disputes are becoming increasingly contentious, and major powers are locked in a struggle of ideas over values such as democracy and human rights. Meanwhile, other pressing global governance challenges like climate change, global health and UN reform require cooperation from major powers. Although the US and China share interests in these areas and have worked together in the past, the growing competition and tensions currently make it impossible to achieve meaningful cooperation on these issues. The world’s problems cannot simply be reduced to competing interests. Increasingly, they are also the result of a trust and coordination deficit between the US and China.

Economic issues and domestic politics will also be obstacles in the coming months to any solutions to the current trade tensions. The U.S.-China trade policy is highly politicized and on the core issues, there is little room for negotiation. These are also being made more complicated in China, with more economic and political pressures being put on the policy and therefore on the negotiating team. The U.S. President has several domestic and international policy matters to contend with, which will take up much of his time and would make it hard to carry on lengthy negotiations on the trade issues. Similarly, President Xi has several domestic and international policy matters on which he will have to focus, which will similarly make it hard to carry on lengthy negotiations on the trade issues.

Whether the US President’s planned visit to China in April 2026 will yield anything or not, only time will tell. It is to be seen whether China and the US will be able to go beyond symbolism and have confidence-building measures. The structural competition is here to stay, but this rivalry between India and the US need not be a destabilising force. The President’s visit will also offer the possibility of finalising some institutional arrangements of the dialogue process so that the process does not lose continuity from time to time; the sector-wise economic cooperation agreements, and discussing reforms of global governance institutions.

This may be the last chance to prevent things from getting worse. Stabilising the relationship reduces US strategic risk and is part of maintaining global stability. It is also an important opportunity for China to show some degree of diplomatic stability and restraint and to avoid continued drift into isolation. The consequences of failing to stabilise the relationship will be dire for the global economy, for Indo-Pacific security and for the rules-based order. But with a commitment to disciplines and a recognition of the need for guardrails, President Trump’s visit has the potential to be transformative and reset the relationship on a more stable footing. Or the world could be careening more rapidly towards crisis.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Hass, R. (2026). Three potential pathways for US–China relations under Trump. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/three-potential-pathways-for-us-china-relations-under-trump/ 

Mederos, Evan. (2026). A new and dangerous era for US-China ties. Council on Foreign Relations. https://globalaffairs.org/commentary/analysis/new-and-dangerous-era-us-china-ties 

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