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The Quants Move To Equities: A Much Bigger Bubble To Burst – OpEd

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The post-2008 equity bubble is portrayed as a larger version of the housing bubble, driven by public-pension inflows into highly leveraged quant long/short and volatility-suppression strategies funded by cheap carry trades.

Rising rates are said to have started the unwind, with simultaneous margin calls and deleveraging expected to produce a roughly 50 percent equity correction.

Any Fed liquidity intervention is expected only to protect market plumbing, not reverse household-wealth or pension losses, which political leaders will claim were unforeseeable.

As described in The Rise of the Quants, the sub‑prime debacle was the product of a nationalized, fully-federalized mortgage market responding to political mandates. With an accommodative Federal Reserve, the system doubled the mortgage stock on a stagnant housing base, doubling house prices. Cheap domestic funding—and especially Japanese carry‑trade flows—pulled the quants in. Ignoring unprecedented price inflation, they made highly-leveraged bets on sub‑prime securities using the same model built on the same assumption: housing prices never fall. GSE purchases kept the bubble expanding until foreign investors, Japan and China, finally questioned the insanity. Once the carry trade ended, the unwinding would have continued until the bubble fully deflated—politically, making homeownership “affordable” again.

As the GSEs suffered credit losses of 50 percent or more of appraised value and entered federal conservatorship, the banks faced a similar fate. Serendipitously, the new Fed Chairman was Ben Bernanke, who, as a professor, had designed the Japanese carry trade and, as a Fed Board member, had encouraged the lending practices that fueled the bubble. “Prudential regulations” allowed federally-insured banks to finance 95-98 percent of these securities with just 1.6 percent capital, the rest funded with federally-insured deposits.

Politicians responded with $20 trillion of Treasury “liquidity facilities,” while Bernanke brought the investment banks under the Fed’s protective umbrella and introduced “temporary” quantitative easing (QE) to inflate mortgage‑security values and zero‑interest‑rate policy (ZIRP) to inflate asset prices generally. The interventions were unprecedented in scope but followed the historic pattern of attempting a soft landing through an opaque bailout. Once these permanent and “temporary” measures were in place, the entire financial and political system was hooked.

Blaming Wall Street, politicians “covered up and doubled down.” They strengthened centralized prudential oversight—modern regulatory regimes, expanded supervisory bodies, and the new Financial Stability Oversight Council ironically chaired by Treasury. These measures did not eliminate systemic risk; they institutionalized moral hazard across the political system. The federal government became dependent on monetized trillion‑dollar deficits. State and local governments—now effectively fiscal........

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