In 1988, when Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic, was forced to accept the ceasefire that ended eight years of war with Iraq, the regime’s resources and strategic capacities had been exhausted, and the front lines were depleted of manpower.

This retreat meant abandoning slogans such as “War, war until victory,” “The road to Jerusalem passes through Karbala,” and “War until the last house in Tehran.” The war had cost more than one trillion dollars and, on the Iranian side, nearly two million dead and wounded.

Khomeini described this capitulation as “drinking the chalice of poison.”

To compensate for this strategic defeat, he launched what has been described as a genocide*. Through a fatwa issued in 1988, Khomeini ordered the massacre of more than 30,000 political prisoners — detainees who remained steadfast in their commitment to the struggle for freedom. Many had already completed their prison sentences but were executed following this decree.

Approximately 90% of those executed were members of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), whom Khomeini accused of advocating a policy of peace and ending the war. Their release, at a time when he had been forced to retreat, would inevitably have accelerated his downfall.

Why Khamenei Does Not Retreat on the Nuclear and Missile Programs

Today, Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, faces a comparable situation.

He cannot abandon the nuclear project, which has cost the country more than $2 trillion, nor can he retreat from the development of the ballistic missile program. The proposal to maintain uranium enrichment on Iranian soil reflects this logic.

Ali Khamenei’s refusal to step back can be explained as follows:

Unlike Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei lacks the same authority and charisma within the regime to impose long-term terror on society through a large-scale massacre. Even repression that resulted in “several thousand deaths” within a few days has failed to silence the population. Uprisings continue.

After three decades, several waves of protest, and an accumulation of growing anger, Iranian society has become far more aware and vigilant.

Moreover, Khamenei does not possess sufficient prestige and authority within the power structure to maintain unity among the regime’s various factions if he were to abandon its core slogans and strategic orientations.

A retreat from the nuclear or ballistic missile programs would create a fracture within the regime’s “hard core” — the essential pillar of its survival — and could accelerate its collapse. This hard core consists primarily of security and intelligence apparatuses, as well as individuals involved in repression, torture, and executions.

To imagine that Iran’s leader could voluntarily renounce his nuclear and missile programs is an illusion.

Khamenei is unlikely to accept the shortest and least costly path to his own downfall — namely, a negotiated retreat from these projects.

And if he were ever forced to abandon them, it would mean that his regime was only one step away from collapse.

In his report covering the period 2018–2022, the United Nations Special Rapporteur, Javed Rahman, stated that the massacres committed in Iran in 1981 and 1988 may amount to genocide. He emphasized that many opponents were executed because of their political and religious beliefs.

© Eurasia Review