That Pakistan is among a small group of capitals being considered as a possible venue for contacts between U.S. and Iranian officials, even as both sides continue to deny that formal negotiations are underway, should not have come as a surprise to those with a finger on the region’s pulse.

Officials familiar with the discussions indicate that Islamabad has remained in sustained contact with Tehran over the past year, including engagements involving Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi and senior Pakistani leadership, while also maintaining a working line to Washington. Pakistan’s additional role in representing Iranian diplomatic interests in the United States has further reinforced its utility in any indirect process.

One need not look further than the fact that Pakistan was one of the first countries to officially denounce strikes on Iran, as it constantly rallied for an end to attacks on civilians in global peacekeeping organisations. An Urdu tweet from Mr Araghchi, not of acknowledgement from Iran’s ambassador in the UN and constant rounds of shutter diplomacy between Deputy Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and his counterparts in the Gulf are enough to further convince the international community about where Pakistan actually stands on the spectrum.

Analysts following the region note that Pakistan’s emergence is not unexpected. Michael Kugelman, for instance, has publicly argued that Pakistan is “far from an unlikely US-Iran mediator,” citing a steady pattern of Pakistan-Iran engagement alongside a perceptible warming of ties between Islamabad and Washington. Some officials in Washington policy circles have also suggested that President Donald Trump views Pakistan as a pragmatic interlocutor, and has spoken favourably of Pakistan’s military leadership—particularly Field Marshall Asim Munir—as having a deeper understanding of Iran than many of his counterparts.

That broader context has fed into what appears to be an expanding, though still opaque, diplomatic effort.

Media reports say Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt are among the countries relaying messages between Washington and Tehran. Islamabad has publicly stated that it is ready to host talks if both parties agree, a position officials describe as procedural rather than aspirational. People briefed on the matter say that this offer has been conveyed quietly through multiple channels.

At the same time, the contours of the effort remain fluid.

Diplomatic chatter in Islamabad suggests that Gulf foreign ministers could visit Pakistan in the coming days as consultations intensify, though no official schedule has been announced. Separate reports circulating in diplomatic and media circles indicate that senior U.S. envoys, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, have figured in backchannel contacts linked to Islamabad, with some accounts placing them in the city for discussions with Iranian-linked interlocutors. These claims may not have been formally confirmed. Yet, a reassuring silence from the White House is the signal we need to read between the lines.

There is also increasing talk of a possible summit format, with one senior regional official cited in media discussions as saying that preliminary contacts are underway to explore an eventual meeting in Islamabad between U.S. and Iranian representatives. Names are already being floated in this context. U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance has been mentioned in several accounts as a potential representative if talks advance, while Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has appeared in political chatter as one of several possible Iranian participants. Of course, anyone thinking of him as Iran’s version of Delcy Rodríguez — someone ready to talk business with President Trump — needs to think again: far from a pliable interlocutor, Ghalibaf is a product of Iran’s hardline security establishment, operating within a system where ultimate authority lies elsewhere and where even perceived pragmatism does not translate into political latitude.

Sources familiar with Iranian internal discussions also note that any delegation from Tehran would likely include multiple senior figures rather than a single negotiator, reflecting the political sensitivity of the process. Public denials from Iranian officials, including Ghalibaf, underscore that no formal configuration has yet been agreed.

Alongside these developments, a parallel stream of more tentative reporting has added to the sense of movement.

According to Al Arabiya News Channel’s bureau chief in South and East Asia, Baker Atyani, Pakistan may have been positioning itself for a mediatory role since the early days of the crisis, with indications of a quiet visit by Iranian officials to Pakistan roughly ten days ago. Other accounts, including commentary from former Pakistani ambassador to Oman, Imran Chaudhry, point to similar contacts in Oman involving Munir, Witkoff and Kushner, described as a possible prelude to Munir’s subsequent telephonic engagement with Trump and discussions around Islamabad as a venue.

These claims remain unverified in official terms, but they broadly align with the pattern of incremental, deniable contacts that typically characterise early-stage conflict diplomacy.

What is clearer is the underlying logic driving Pakistan’s role.

Officials say Islamabad has strong incentives to prevent further escalation, given its geographic proximity to Iran, economic exposure to Gulf instability, and domestic sensitivity to regional tensions. At the same time, its maintained ties with Tehran, working relationships with Gulf capitals, and renewed access in Washington give it a degree of diplomatic flexibility that is currently in short supply.

Even so, people familiar with the discussions caution that the process remains at an exploratory stage. Tehran has continued publicly to reject the idea of direct negotiations while setting out firm conditions for any engagement, while Washington has signalled openness to dialogue without easing pressure.

In that environment, officials in Islamabad say, any role played by Pakistan is likely to remain informal and incremental, focused on facilitating contact rather than brokering a comprehensive settlement.

Diplomats involved in regional consultations stress that early-stage mediation often unfolds in precisely this manner, with overlapping channels, partial disclosures and public denials running in parallel until a clearer political opening emerges.

For now, Pakistan appears to have positioned itself as a credible and useful node in that evolving network.

Whether that role develops into a formal mediation effort—or remains a quieter exercise in message-carrying—will at the end of the day depend on the willingness of Washington and Tehran to move beyond the current phase of guarded engagement.

© Eurasia Review