The principal question regarding the attacks by the United States and Israel on the Islamic Republic is what plan the attacking force has in hand after the strike. In the event of the collapse of the Islamic regime, who will be the successor to power?

The extension of the current tension is likely desired neither by the United States, nor by Israel, nor by the countries of the region. None of these states would want a long, turbulent, and costly war. However, a force that carries out such a large-scale attack on the Islamic Republic, if it seeks to remove and eliminate the ruling apparatus, must logically have an alternative up its sleeve. Which alternative?

Future Political Stability as an Attainable Horizon

The force that today is present in the political space inside and outside Iran is Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. Through his own efforts, the support of the Israeli government, certain news networks, and a significant portion of the Iranian people, he has now emerged as the sole active alternative on the scene. This popularity is necessary, but in terms of political strategy and the determination of the foundations of future political stability of the country, it is still insufficient.

The future alternative for Iran must be able to establish political stability, security, and positive relations with the West and Israel. In this regard, the question is this: under Iran’s current highly sensitive wartime conditions, and given the multiplicity of claimants to power, the particular position of ethnic groups, specifically the armed capacity of Kurdish and Baluch communities and other ethnic groups, as well as other political organizations such as the Mojahedin with decades of political experience, and also Iran’s former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi and the Group of Seventeen, who are in Iran and possess influence, can one simply imagine a stable future after the collapse of the Islamic regime without dialogue and agreement with these groups, or at least the most important once?

If dialogue and agreement with these groups do not take place from now on, despite the activity of all these groups at various levels, the future holders of power will either have to intimidate these forces and drive them out of the ground, a process that would undoubtedly drag Iran into internal conflicts and turmoil, similar to what we saw in Syria, Libya, and other countries, or they must reach an understanding with them (or at least with the most important among them),  so that a future Iran may take shape without tension and with respect for the rights of all claimants to power and all citizens. 

Any agreement, however, must be realized before the transfer of power so that the focus of post-Islamist actions will be solely the reconstruction and development of the country and national security, rather than the endless expenditure of energy and time on resolving disputes, misunderstandings, and drawing lines of confrontation.

All indications are that the United States also seeks precisely this stability and security.

The Danger of Continuing War and the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The war-inclined forces of the ruling regime had repeatedly indicated that if the United States attacked the Islamic Republic, the regime would strike other countries in the region and U.S. bases. And it did so. Yet the noteworthy point is the remarks of Ebrahim Jabbari, adviser to the commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Guards, on the first day of the war, warning that “we possess weapons that we have not yet shown and will unveil later.” These statements may be nothing more than the Islamic Republic’s habitual exaggerations. But if this claim is placed alongside the remarks of Rafael Grossi, that the Islamic Republic still possesses 400 kilograms of uranium, capable of producing nuclear weapons, one becomes aware of the dangers posed by the Islamic Republic’s jihadist and apocalyptic character: “Iran holds enough uranium to build ten nuclear weapons if it chose to enrich further…”

The Day After the War

If the United States, in its attacks, limits itself to destroying the regime’s military power and its nuclear facilities and remains within these bounds, leaving the finishing of the matter to the people in the streets, there is no doubt that this will not eliminate the regime. The regime will remain and may even find limited means to rebuild itself. In that case, the regime will undoubtedly seek once again to carry out a bloody repression of the people. The day after the war, there must be no trace of the regime. Now that the attacks have begun, the matter must be finished. Leaving this action half-completed would benefit the regime.

Contrary to the statements of Donald Trump and Netanyahu, the people alone do not have the ability to confront even the remnants of the regime. One cannot and must not send unarmed people in front of bullets. The people of Iran are unarmed and lack military training, and in the protests of this year’s Dey month we saw that the regime, without any mercy or compassion, resorted to comprehensive repression. If the recent attacks do not lead to the destruction of the structure of repression, if they do not result in the creation of a strong national political alternative, darkness and oppression will once again continue in Iran.

© Eurasia Review