The author says Iran has widened its campaign across the Gulf—hitting states that had stayed on the sidelines, including a mediator (Oman) and a close partner (Qatar)—to raise pressure without forcing a single all-out regional war.

Arab states have not activated a joint GCC military command. Instead they have used law, diplomacy, and economics: Riyadh meetings, Arab League condemnation, a UN Security Council briefing and resolution, plus national steps such as a UAE trade embargo and Saudi de-escalation.

The piece argues Tehran’s bet that the Gulf could not coordinate has so far failed, but the war is not over. Next needs cited: shared doctrine, intelligence-sharing, and export routes that do not depend so heavily on the Strait of Hormuz.

Since it started attacking the region on Feb. 28, Iran has been widening the geography of its strikes across the Gulf, following a clear pattern as Tehran has steadily brought more Arab states into the conflict, raising the pressure on governments that have so far sought to stay out of it. 

The response from the Arab world, however, has been notably different, with clear legal, diplomatic and economic measures but no move toward a collective military response. For Iran, that distinction is becoming an important measure of how far it can push without turning regional pressure into a broader war. In security studies, this is known as horizontal escalation, widening the conflict to create pressure elsewhere rather than simply increasing the intensity of the original fight. 

Iran’s retaliation following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s assassination and the opening US-Israeli strikes quickly escalated beyond the familiar Strait of Hormuz-UAE axis that had shaped earlier rounds of confrontation. In fact, the UAE took the heaviest share of the attacks, intercepting more Iranian missiles and drones than any other country in the conflict, including Israel. But Iran also struck countries that had........

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