When Richard Nixon entered the White House in 1969, the US was strategically overextended and politically constrained. The Vietnam War was deadlocked, domestic riots intensified, and credibility in the US appeared strained. Alongside his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, Nixon attempted to shift the psychological landscape of the conflict. The so-called ‘madman theory’ was the deliberate cultivation of perceived unpredictability, instead of genuine irrationality. The objective was to convince adversaries—particularly the Soviets—that Nixon could escalate to extreme measures, including nuclear use, if overtly provoked. The strategic logic was based upon the calculation that the Soviets would pressure the North Vietnamese to compromise if Moscow believed that Nixon was frivolous enough to escalate. The most vivid case of this approach was Operation Giant Lance in October 1969. At the time, nuclear-armed B-52 bombers were placed on high-alert patrols near Soviet airspace for three consecutive days, which were purposefully designed to be detectable. By intensifying bombing operations both in Vietnam and Cambodia, the US strengthened the impression that the escalation threshold was uncertain.

With many decades having now passed from the above events, the historical evaluation is still ambiguous. Although it is true that the Soviet leadership took note of the US signal, the evidence that the Soviets fundamentally altered their strategy out of fear of Nixon’s instability is somewhat limited. America’s domestic constraints also weakened the credibility of an extreme threat. The adversaries fully understood that US public opinion radically limited escalation options. Eventually, the 1973 Paris Peace Accord reflected more of attrition and diplomatic maneuvering, rather than successful coercive unpredictability. Therefore, the lesson is twofold. Strategic ambiguity could compound the complexity of the opponent’s calculations, yet performed irrationality also does not guarantee concession. Its effectiveness depends on a series of elements including comprehensive balance of power, alliance cohesion, and the opponent’s perception of credibility.

Today’s Northeast Asia presents a more complex and nuclearized environment compared to 1969 Vietnam. This region is facing an increasing possibility of a dual contingency—China initiating military operations against Taiwan and North Korea conducting militarily provocative activities simultaneously. North Korea’s expanding missile capability, which could carry nuclear warheads to Japan, South Korea, and even the United States, is deepening........

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