France and Germany reconciled not because they had forgotten history. They were able to pursue a path towards rapprochement because institutions that made practical cooperation possible were created before trust developed naturally over time. This feature is probably the most important lesson for contemporary Japan and South Korea. To be sure, their historical experience is different, and Northeast Asia is not Europe. Nonetheless, the Franco-German case illustrates how erstwhile enemies could embark upon limited, functional cooperation based on rules in areas where shared interests are clear and political sensitivities are high.

The process began with strategic restraint. The Schuman Declaration of May 1950 proposed pooling coal and steel production under a common authority. Coal and steel mattered because they were the industrial foundation of a nation’s warfighting capacity. Placing them under shared rules did not obviate France’s fear of Germany or Germany’s disgruntlement after the war. However, it made unilateral military mobilization difficult and cooperation routine The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) enlarged this logic toward more sensitive areas. The treaty that established Euratom was signed in 1957 by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Nuclear energy symbolized technological modernity, energy security, and state power. At the same time, it aroused concerns about nuclear proliferation, secrecy, and unequal advantage. The birth of Euratom facilitated research on civilian nuclear power, investment, common standards, supply systems, and safeguards. Its purpose was not emotional reconciliation. Rather, it was disciplined cooperation in a sector too important to leave to state-to-state competition.

This is why Euratom is highly relevant to today’s Japan-South Korea security cooperation. Euratom demonstrated that even sensitive technology could be successfully managed by transparency, restricted authority, and repeated consultations. France and West Germany did not—and perhaps, could not—settle all historical issues before initiating cooperation on civilian nuclear energy. Moreover, Euratom did not require a bilateral military pact. It created habits of cooperation, technological trust, and institutional predictability. Although landmark events such as the 1963 Elysée Treaty and later the 1975 Helsinki Final Act deepened political consultation between the two sides, they rested on the prior outcome of the late 1950s that transformed cooperation into normalcy.

For Japan and South Korea, a similar approach—instead of a mechanical imitation—is needed. South Korea’s experience of Japan’s thirty-five years of colonial rule is dissimilar to the record of interstate war between France and Germany or the latter’s occupation of the former during World War II. In addition, Tokyo and Seoul are not currently in the process of building a regional union akin to the European Union or even the European Economic Community (EEC). However, both countries are technologically advanced........

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