Contemporary debates on Indo-Pacific security often begin with an implicit assumption: that credible deterrence necessitates a formal alliance structure—either a bilateral one or collective defense system like NATO. In Northeast Asia, such an assumption is translated into a question of whether Japan and South Korea could effectively deter regional spoilers even without a mutual defense treaty. Yet the historical experience illustrates that this question might be misplaced. Deterrence has not always been dependent on legal commitments. On some occasions, it has emerged through political alignment, operational coordination, and repeated interaction during crisis situations.

The evolving relationship between Britain and France in the decade prior to WWI offers a particularly meaningful example. The First Moroccan Crisis and the Agadir Crisis tested the durability of the Entente Cordiale—later evolved into the Triple Entente in 1907—which was quite different from a formal alliance. Germany, under Wilhelm II, attempted to exploit such ambiguity. Nevertheless, the result was the opposite. Germany’s coercive diplomacy transformed a limited diplomatic understanding into a strategically credible Entente. The end result was one form of deterrence that altered Germany’s strategic calculation without the existence of a binding treaty.

Originally, the Entente Cordiale was not designed as a military pact. Instead, its primary goal was to resolve long-standing colonial disputes in Africa—evidenced by numerous events including the Fashoda Incident. However, Germany perceived this arrangement as a potential step towards encirclement and tried to disrupt it before it could deepen. The First Moroccan Crisis was triggered by Wilhelm II’s visit to Tangier in 1905, where he openly challenged France’s influence in Morocco and called for an international conference. Berlin’s objective was clear: to diplomatically isolate France and to examine whether Britain would maintain neutrality on issues that were considered peripheral colonial matters.

Germany’s strategy was grounded on an important assumption—that Britain, traditionally cautious of intervening in continental affairs, could prioritize strategic flexibility over commitment. Yet this assumption turned out to be profoundly wrong. Germany failed to isolate France at the Algeciras Conference. Alongside other great powers, Britain generally supported a framework that largely preserved French influence. More importantly, this crisis changed Britain’s perception of Germany.

However, the most important consequence unfolded beneath the official diplomacy. After the crisis, Britain and France initiated a series of military staff talks, which prepared the foundation of operational coordination. In these talks, the potential deployment of the British Expeditionary Force to the European continent in the event of war, as well as a division of naval responsibilities—Britain focusing on the North Sea and the English Channel while France concentrating on the Mediterranean—were discussed. Neither of these measures was codified as a treaty. Yet they created practical expectations for cooperation, reduced uncertainty during........

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