Nicaragua was characterised by political unrest for a large part of the 1900s. The Sandinista uprising against the Somoza government in 1979 was supposed to mark a new time in Nicaraguan history.[1] However, the Sandinistas failed to sufficiently improve the economic state and societal standards in the country. As a reaction to the poor governance and doubts regarding the intentions of the new government, the Contra insurgency developed. Despite strong efforts, they were unsuccessful in overthrowing the Sandinista government. At the end of the ’80s, the Sandinistas and Contras agreed to a ceasefire, and the insurgency had to gradually disarm.[2] After a long revolution that weighed heavily on Nicaragua, the insurgency no longer posed an active threat to the government and ended in failure. This essay will explore why the insurgency failed and argue that it failed due to a combination of inadequate external support, insufficient military, and lack of support from the population.

The first section of the essay will explore how the US support affected the insurgency and how the loss of it helped lead to its failure. The second section will consider the military factors that led to the Contra failure. Finally, the essay will consider how the lack of support from the Nicaraguan population was the final factor that led to the insurgency’s defeat. The essay will conclude that the reason for the insurgency’s failure was not a single mistake, but a combination of all these factors, culminating in the Contras collapse.

Before answering the question, I see the need to define what an insurgency is. For the purpose of the essay, the definition will be based on O’Neill’s definition of insurgency. An insurgency is, therefore, a nonruling group that “consciously uses political resources […] and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”[3] The scope of the essay will be limited to only consider the time after the Sandinistas had already overthrown the Somoza government and become the legitimate government in Nicaragua. There is some inconsistency amongst academics regarding whether the Contras were the insurgency or counterinsurgency, as the Sandinistas started as a revolutionary movement against the Somoza regime. However, as the essay discusses the time after the Sandinistas became the official government, the Contras were an insurgency. 

Inadequate external support

The Contra insurgency developed as a response to the dissatisfaction with the Sandinista government in the 1980s and was fuelled by the socioeconomic differences between classes.[4] While the Sandinista government originally was intended to be democratic, doubts regarding whether or not this was the case, added to the concerns and tension surrounding the regime.[5] It consisted of a combination of three different active fronts, ex-soldiers from the national guard during the Somoza regime in Honduras, Moskito Indians, and The Democratic Revolutionary Alliance in Costa Rica.[6]

The Sandinista-Contra war was largely affected by the ongoing Cold War tensions, and while the insurgency partly developed organically, some academics argue that they were organised fully by the American government as a way to contain the feared spread of Marxism in Central America.[7] The United States openly disapproved of the Sandinista government and had incentive to support the Contras due to the Sandinista politics being rooted in communist ideology. As a way of weakening the government’s position, the US allocated resources to fund the insurgency in the guise of defending the freedom of the Nicaraguan population and protecting democracy.[8] In addition to providing funding, the CIA supported them through covert operations in the early 1980s.[9] The US government aided the insurgency with training, recruiting, and intelligence collection.[10] Considering this, it is clear that the US aid to the insurgency played a significant role in allowing it to gain momentum in its early stages. However, the US and the Contras soon faced significant challenges, and the help that was initially meant to secure the insurgency’s success became a detrimental factor in its downfall.

In 1984, it became public that the US and the CIA had contributed to the insurgency in mining Nicaraguan harbours. At the time, President Reagan had recently made the case for covert aid to halt the Sandinistas. However, the mining scandal led the administration to face criticism, and the government could not be convinced to authorise the previously promised aid.[11] The Contras were still able to remain active and continue to cause destruction despite the public retracement of the funding.[12] This was due to Congress only initially banning support to the Contras from the CIA and Department of Defence.[13] Therefore, the insurgency was still able to receive support from other agencies and actors.

When the news broke about National Security Council professionals having funnelled profits from arms sales to Iran into the Contras in 1986, support for the insurgency received even more criticism.[14] Part of the NSC had privately engaged in deals with Iran, where they had traded arms for hostages, and some of the profits from the exchanges had been diverted to the organisation.[15] The controversy became known as the Iran-Contra affair.[16] The scandal was the beginning of the end for them, as they struggled to uphold their activities without funding. It was clear that the survival of the Contras was dependent on American aid, and indirectly, this helped the Sandinista’s prospects of defeating the insurgency. In counterinsurgency theory, cutting off the insurgency from its support is a factor that can promote the defeat of the insurgency.[17] When the Contras were cut........

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