The announcement that China has formally commenced construction of what is being described as the world’s largest hydroelectric project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet has sent strategic shockwaves across South Asia. Estimated to cost around $168 billion and expected to dwarf even China’s Three Gorges Dam in power generation capacity, the project has raised serious concerns in India regarding water security, environmental risks, and the strategic implications of upstream control.

The development has also exposed an uncomfortable reality for New Delhi: India now finds itself in the same position that Pakistan has occupied for decades as a lower-riparian state dependent upon waters originating beyond its borders.

The question naturally arises: Will India now demand from China the same transparency, data sharing, consultation, and treaty compliance that Pakistan has long demanded from India under the Indus Waters Treaty?

The Legal Standing of the Indus Waters Treaty

The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), brokered by the World Bank, remains one of the most successful and durable international water-sharing agreements in modern history.

The treaty allocated the three eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej – to India while granting Pakistan rights over the three western rivers – Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab – with limited Indian usage under clearly defined conditions.

What makes the treaty unique is that it survived wars in 1965, 1971, the Kargil conflict of 1999, and numerous political crises. International legal experts have repeatedly pointed out that treaties cannot ordinarily be suspended unilaterally simply because political relations deteriorate.

The principle of pacta sunt servanda – agreements must be honoured – is one of the cornerstones of international law. Water treaties are especially important because they concern the survival, agriculture, energy security, and livelihoods of millions of people.

India’s Attempt........

© Daily Times