Doug Nealy.

Without Rhyme or Reason

“We welcomed the Chinese Communist Party into this global order. And they took advantage of all its benefits. But they ignored all its obligations and responsibilities. Instead, they have lied, cheated, hacked and stolen their way to global superpower status, at our expense.”

So said Senator Marco Rubio during confirmation hearings to become secretary of state in the second Trump administration. In those few lines were indicators of the core beliefs that underlie current US policy toward China: that only China has “ignored all its obligations and responsibilities” and is untrustworthy; that China cheated its way to becoming rich; and, most disturbing, that US trade and technology policy must fully disconnect from China lest it continue to develop “at our expense.”

Rubio took a page from Ronald Reagan’s accusation that the Russians “lie, cheat, and steal.” Except that Reagan found common ground with Moscow on arms control and rejected a tariff war to correct US trade deficits. Now, Donald Trump, in his second time around as President, has rejected finding common ground as the basis for relations with China and is again conducting a tariff war.

Following the Project 2025 script on China—specifically, Peter Navarro’s section on trade relations—Trump has made a significant economic decoupling the essence of his China policy. In direct contrast, Beijing, along with the European Union, has become the leading exponent of economic globalization: multilateralism, negotiations to lower trade barriers, and assured supply chains. To China’s not-so-quiet satisfaction, Trump has put the US on the outside of the system, looking in and finding few allies.

Trump’s Tariff Barrage

For many years, Donald Trump has based his obsession with trade deficits on the belief that Japan and China have “ripped off” America. His current tariff war with China is an extension of the tariffs he imposed in his first term. Except that now, he has gone far beyond past tariff hikes—first, by imposing two 10-percent tariffs, then by hitting China with a further 34-percent tariff in March. When China matched Trump’s tariffs, he piled on, raising the tariff rate to 145 percent in April. China again responded, this time with a 125-percent tariff on US goods plus restrictions on rare earth minerals exports to the US and on 11 US companies that will no longer be able to do business in China.

Trump’s public argument for the tariffs is two-fold: US trade partners with the highest trade surpluses must lower their tariffs on US imports, and US and other multinational firms must move their manufacturing back to the US if they want to avoid tariffs. China, with a trade surplus with the US of around $295 billion, is the leading target.

The Trump strategy comes down to this: If China does not lower its tariffs, the US will not lower its tariff on Chinese goods, forcing China and US companies based in China to seek alternative markets in neighboring countries. But they will supposedly be blocked there, since Trump has imposed very high tariffs on their exports to the US: 46 percent on Vietnam, 49 percent on Cambodia, 24 percent on Malaysia, and 36 percent on Thailand. As an unnamed

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