Foreign Policy > Iran War

It is not unusual for the demands of war to exceed what was contemplated during peace.

William R. Hawkins | April 22, 2026

We can dismiss the so-called “antiwar” agitation against the U.S. war with Iran for what it always is, a desire to see America defeated because a victory would be an affront to their perverse ideological and partisan ideas. There are, however, other critics of the war who deserve attention because their motivation is to keep America strong and prepared for what they see as more important conflicts. For example, James Holmes, the J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, fears that we are expending resources in a “fourth ranked theater” when we are facing a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan which will require a massive defensive effort.

Holmes’ argument that the current U.S. campaign against the Tehran regime will only produce a Pyrrhic Victory -- one that “exhausts the victor’s martial resources, bringing about eventual defeat if not downfall” is valid for King Pyrrhus of Epirus because he “confronted a foe that could replenish its strength more readily than his own host could.” Yet, it is not as applicable to President Donald Trump as it may seem. Epirus was a small state under a fanatic leader fighting against a Roman Republic building an empire that would dominate Europe for centuries. In this analogy, Iran is the modern Epirus claiming phony victories that have left it devastated.

Another frequent example, even more attractive to historians, is Athens' expedition to Sicily in 415 BC, diverting a large military force to besiege Syracuse (an ally of Sparta) when Athens was facing a more direct existential threat from Sparta itself. The problem with this analogy is that the Athenian expedition was destroyed in Sicily (after a Spartan general arrived to take command), while our Iranian expedition has won. The argument is reduced to claiming that while our warships have not been sunk, they are disarmed with empty magazines. The analogy can be taken further. Athens fought for another ten years, rebuilding its fleet and winning renewed maritime superiority at the battle of Cyzicus in 410 BC. During this time other things occurred that have more in common with today’s problems. Athen’s economy was weakened by Spartan attacks on its supply chains. There were bitter internal political struggles that sapped unity and undermined strategic continuity. And Persia (the eternal foe) aided the growing Spartan fleet that defeated the Athenians in 405 BC at the war’s decisive Battle of Aegospotami.

There is no inherent reason that Americans, whose $32 trillion GDP accounts for 25% of the world total, should fear there could be any “foe that could replenish its strength more readily” than we can. The present danger that weapons used against Iran cannot be replaced fast enough to confront or deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is the result of negligent policy that with effort can be fixed.

It is not unusual for the demands of war to exceed what was contemplated during peace. In the early years of World War I, Great Britain had to ration artillery firing because of a shortage of shells, resulting in heavier infantry casualties and lost battles. The “shell crisis of 1915” led to the creation of a new Ministry of Munitions led by David Lloyd George, whose success in mobilizing industry led to his becoming prime minister. Then as now there was a labor shortage in the factories but for different reasons. Men had left their jobs for military service whereas today decades of “deindustrialization” allowed manufacturing to move offshore has reduced the supply of blue-collar employees to draw on. Both world wars saw women replacing men in industry whereas today a new generation of workers is having to be trained in community colleges and special corporate programs with pay incentives that surpass most college degrees.

Great Britain then, like the U.S. today, had fought many “small wars” across the globe in the decades before 1914, but these had not placed such a heavy burden on industry that it drove expansion. In the Royal Navy there had been an arms race following the introduction of the Dreadnought battleship design with a continuous increase in main gun calibers which required new shell production rather than stockpiling. Innovation today poses a similar problem with new weapons like drones (and defense against them) needing production, adding to improvements in existing systems and replacement of weapons used in combat.

The United States was in even worse condition when it entered WW I in 1917. America had surpassed the combined industrial output of Britain and Germany combined by 1908. Yet, except for the navy, we did not have a defense industrial base. Despite watching the war rage for three years, America had done little to prepare for a war its leaders hoped to avoid. While it was easy to call up manpower, arming them was another matter. Doughboys went into combat with French artillery, machine guns, tanks, and aircraft supplemented by British equipment from what was by then fully mobilized European war industries.

The Trump Administration is well aware of the problem. Sectary of War Pete Hegseth has repeated stated that we are only using 10% of our naval strength against Iran. Rebuilding and expanding our defense industrial base have been priorities in both Trump terms. The 2026 National Security Strategy states “American national power depends on a strong industrial sector capable of meeting both peacetime and wartime production demands. That requires not only direct defense industrial production capacity but also defense-related production capacity. Cultivating American industrial strength must become the highest priority of national economic policy.” The Trump administration has been using trade policy as well as the authorities provided by the 1950 Defense Production Act to rebuild the nation’s strategic industrial base and secure supply chains for critical minerals. On March 6, President Trump met with executives from the major defense contractors to discuss the expansion of munition production which had supposedly commenced three months prior. Missile production, both offensive and defensives, was set to increase four-fold after the President had criticized the industry earlier for being sluggish. President Trump has not yet threatened to take over the industry like Lloyd George did, though Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has raised the issue of direct Federal investment in defense firms.

The proposed increase of the 2027 defense budget to $1.5 trillion will just barely put such spending at the 5% of GDP President Trump has demanded all NATO members meet. The section on manufacturing in the recently released NATO annual report states “The Alliance is already home to the world’s leading defence industrial suppliers, but a more challenging security environment means Allies need to produce more equipment more quickly. They need to work together -- alongside partners such as Ukraine, the EU and in the Indo-Pacific -- to ramp up industrial production and speed up innovation and the adoption of new technologies.” America’s NATO partners have an aggregate $20 trillion GDP, an economic potential that dwarfs the Russian economy by a 10-1 margin. Awakened from the post-Cold War doldrums, European NATO can handle continental security releasing the U.S. to concentrate on the Indo-Pacific with its Asian partners who also possess robust economic capabilities and advanced technology.

The problem is how much time does America have to renew its defense industrial production before the anticipated confrontation with China? Xi Jinping’s purge of his military commanders seem motivated by his impatience with the PLA’s preparations for such a confrontation. That moves the risk date from 2027 to 2029 (when a new, untried U.S. president might seem uncertain in his response) or beyond. That is a time frame within which an abundant America has been able to respond in the past when properly motivated.

William R. Hawkins is a former economics professor who has worked for several Washington think tanks and on the staff of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee. He has written widely on international economics and national security issues for both professional and popular publications including for the Army War College, the U.S. Naval Institute, and the National Defense University, among others. 

Image: National Archives

SUPPORT AMERICAN THINKER

Now more than ever, the ability to speak our minds is crucial to the republic we cherish. If what you see on American Thinker resonates with you, please consider supporting our work with a donation of as much or as little as you can give. Every dollar contributed helps us pay our staff and keep our ideas heard and our voices strong. Thank you.

© American Thinker