Listen to this article:

Chandigarh: With its 27th constitutional amendment, Pakistan has vested exclusive control of its nuclear arsenal in self-styled Field Marshal Asim Munir, concentrating authority in a single unelected leader – a move reminiscent of North Korea, where strategic weapons are similarly commanded by an absolute and unaccountable Supreme Leader.

Beyond this structural similarity, a deeper historical symmetry also emerges: both Islamabad and Pyongyang had developed their nuclear programmes under sustained Chinese technical, financial and diplomatic support. Beijing’s long-term patronage had not only enabled the expansion of respective nuclear stockpiles but also helped configure their atomic weapons and delivery systems – Pakistan’s, in particular, explicitly aimed at India.

Additionally, in the 1990s, Pakistan and North Korea had deepened bilateral strategic ties through the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, which, with Pakistani military assistance, clandestinely transferred critical nuclear technology, centrifuge designs, and technical know-how to Pyongyang in exchange for Nodong-class ballistic missiles.

China once again subtly supported this illicit exchange, allowing transfers to proceed with minimal international scrutiny, accelerating both countries’ nuclear programmes: North Korea gained the capacity to produce fissile material more rapidly, while Pakistan enhanced its strategic missile delivery capabilities.

Initially, Pakistan’s nuclear command structure involved multiple actors – military, political, and civilian – providing a degree of institutional diffusion and oversight. Over decades, this architecture has shifted gradually. And with the 27th amendment – approved near-unanimously by the National Assembly, Senate, and endorsed by President Asif Ali Zardari last week – total authority over the country’s strategic assets is now vested in Asim Munir, 57, who is echoing North Korea’s model of a single, unaccountable nuclear decision-maker, raising serious concerns over concentrating such power in an already volatile region in one entity.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme has always been India-centric, even before its May 1998 underground atomic tests. Thereafter, its ‘first-use’ doctrine evolved into a full-spectrum deterrence posture designed to counter India’s conventional superiority, incorporating tactical battlefield systems such as the Nasr/Hatf-IX, with a 60-70 km strike range, alongside longer-range assets, capable of targeting both counter-force and counter-value sites across India.

Both missile systems are designed to safeguard Pakistan’s survival and, by extension, the Army’s primacy, while signalling that even limited conflicts with India carry the risk of nuclear........

© The Wire