menu_open Columnists
We use cookies to provide some features and experiences in QOSHE

More information  .  Close

Iran’s Shadow War Comes to America

17 0
yesterday

As U.S.-Iran hostilities intensify again, Washington must confront a second front in the conflict: the possibility that Tehran could seek to retaliate through covert networks, cyber operations, and other asymmetric means far beyond the Middle East.

The latest escalation between the United States and Iran has renewed attention to the military balance in the Middle East. But the most consequential Iranian response may not necessarily take the form of another missile barrage, drone attack, or conventional military exchange.

It could take place somewhere else.

As Washington and Tehran enter a more volatile phase of their confrontation, the United States must prepare for the possibility that Iran will seek to impose costs through the instruments in which weaker powers often find their greatest advantage: intelligence operations, cyberattacks, illicit finance, criminal intermediaries, proxy relationships, and covert action.

That possibility gives the conflict an immediate domestic dimension.

The central question is no longer simply how the United States will respond to Iranian actions in the Middle East. It is whether Tehran, facing sustained military and economic pressure, will attempt to extend the confrontation beyond the battlefield—and whether the FBI and its Joint Terrorism Task Forces are positioned to detect and disrupt any credible threat before it matures into violence on American soil.

Iran does not need to defeat the United States in a conventional war to impose costs on Americans.

It can operate in the shadows.

A military setback for Tehran would not automatically eliminate its capacity for retaliation. Airstrikes can destroy military infrastructure, but they cannot erase intelligence contacts, financial channels, cyber capabilities, criminal relationships, or covert facilitators developed over many years.

Indeed, the renewed intensity of the conflict may increase the strategic value of such tools. A state unable—or unwilling—to match American conventional power directly has strong incentives to search for forms of retaliation that are less predictable, less attributable, and more difficult to deter.

This is where the FBI’s role becomes central.

The Bureau and its Joint Terrorism Task Forces were created to confront precisely the problem that arises when foreign threats acquire a domestic dimension. Their task is not to assume that every Iranian connection represents a danger, nor to transform legitimate concern about hostile intelligence activity into collective suspicion of Iranian Americans or any other community.

Such an approach would be both morally wrong and strategically counterproductive.

The task is more demanding: to distinguish between association and intent, between hostile rhetoric and operational preparation, and between a theoretical danger and a threat beginning to take concrete form.

The United States is entering a period in which the risk of escalation cannot be measured solely by the number of aircraft deployed, missiles launched, or military facilities destroyed. Modern conflict rarely remains confined........

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)