Germany’s current Erinnerungspolitik (its highly institutionalized culture of Holocaust remembrance) is often presented as if it were a natural and continuous outgrowth of the postwar period, while not being that at all. In reality, it is a relatively late political and societal achievement, taking clearer shape only decades after the war and solidifying in its current form after reunification in 1990.

In the intervening years, official West German discourse frequently emphasized German suffering and tended to narrow responsibility for Nazi crimes to a limited circle of figures tried at the Nuremberg Trials. Meanwhile, large numbers of former Nazis were reintegrated into public life, with some returning to positions of influence in politics, industry, and state institutions.

Now the lesson from this is not to resurface German Israeli enmity but instead point out that just as we know that de-Imperialization essentially did not happen in Japan, we can also stop pretending that de-Nazification was a thing in Germany, or in Italy. And while de-Ba’athifaction was certainly an event in Iraq it is known more for its negative consequences than its positive ones. And then we can accordingly adjust our expectation on Gazan de-Hamasification. Or Syrian de-Islamization. That does not mean that we should let our guard down and expect things to magically get better, not at all. But we cannot expect that no Hamas members will be in the new Government or assume that because there is a continuation between the personnel of the terror organization and the new state that there will necessarily also be continuation in terms of policy and ideology.

The reason why we collectively think that de-Nazification was effective is because while there was a personality continuity between Nazi Germany and the FRG there was no policy continuity due to the external pressures to adjust their politics. And with time there was enough pressure and geopolitical interests to reconsider how they viewed their own history and actions, but that took 45 years and another radical shift in the geopolitical realities. Today Germany is our second most important ally after the United States, from 1952 till 1965 they were in fact our most important military ally. In a time when many in their government were of old Nazi stock. Two noteworthy examples: one influential member of the German team negotiating with Israel during the 1952 Luxembourg reparations agreement was Dr. Hermann Josef Abs, a senior Deutsche Bank executive during the Nazi era, who was involved in and benefited from the Aryanization of Jewish-owned businesses. And Germany’s first ambassador to Israel, Rolf Pauls, was a decorated Wehrmacht officer who had served on the Eastern Front, a striking choice barely two decades after the Holocaust that caused a diplomatic conflict and could be interpreted as a move by the FGR saying “accept us as we are; we do not intend to hide or fully disavow this past.”

Meanwhile, to the east, the GDR while making a much more thorough job of “cleansing” itself from former Nazi members in its political and professional ranks was known for a very aggressively anti-Israeli stance. That did not stop at diplomatic rhetoric but extended to material support for Arab states and Palestinian organizations, intelligence cooperation, and even direct support for terror organizations. One that to their credit that did apologize for, barely 6 months before their dissolution.

So, lets focus less on not allowing any former Hamas member into power in Gaza but on changing their interests, their patrons, and the power relations between all players in the region and beyond. Then we can hope that in 40 years Palestinians will not celebrate the 7th of October and will make peace with our existence in their internal narratives.

And till then they only need to change how they act towards us. And that depends on the Geopolitical realities which we can shape around us and them. For that it is not enough to put military pressure on Gaza or send protest notes to Washington, for that we need to widen the Abraham Accords and work on greater regional cooperation. Without external support Hamas ideology of denying Jewish presence between the river and the sea are economically and politically non-viable (even now it is not viable, but it becomes much more demonstrably so without outside support). And the best way to deny them that support is not to be a modern-day Sparta but instead be a much more useful partner in peace, economically, and in strategic resources like water and gas.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)