The current confrontation with Iran illustrates a persistent analytical limitation in Western strategic thought: the projection of a cost–benefit model of rationality onto actors whose decision-making frameworks are shaped by fundamentally different ideological and institutional structures. This essay argues that current US–Israel strategy misinterprets Iranian behavior by applying an inappropriate model of rationality—one that assumes cost sensitivity and behavioral convergence where neither can be reliably expected.

This limitation is particularly evident in the shared assumptions underlying US–Israel strategic coordination, where deterrence is premised on the expectation that increasing material costs will induce behavioral change. This expectation reflects the classical deterrence framework articulated by Thomas Schelling in The Strategy of Conflict, which posits that rational actors adjust their behavior in response to shifting cost structures.¹ However, a substantial body of scholarship on Iran challenges the applicability of this model. Rather than operating as a purely utility-maximizing actor, the Islamic Republic exhibits a hybrid strategic logic in which ideological legitimacy, regime preservation, and resistance to external pressure play central roles. As demonstrated in Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs, Iran’s political system integrates factional competition with a normative commitment to resistance, thereby limiting the effectiveness of coercive external pressure.²

This divergence becomes particularly salient in Iran’s strategic use of maritime geography. The role of the Strait of Hormuz has been analyzed in detail by Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold, who show that Iran’s military doctrine incorporates the potential disruption of maritime traffic as a deliberate instrument of deterrence.³ This is not an incidental tactic but part of a broader asymmetric strategy designed to compensate for conventional military inferiority. Similarly, Shahram Chubin emphasizes that Iran’s strategic behavior must be understood within a framework that combines deterrence, prestige, and regime survival rather than purely economic rationality.⁴

These findings indicate that Iranian strategic rationality cannot be reduced to immediate cost minimization. Rather, it reflects a broader conception of deterrence in which the credibility of resistance—even at significant cost—constitutes a rational outcome. This interpretation is consistent with Suzanne Maloney’s analysis, which demonstrates the regime’s capacity to absorb prolonged economic pressure, as well as with Thierry Juneau’s study highlighting the continuity of Iran’s regional strategy despite shifting external constraints.⁵

A similar misinterpretation underlies expectations regarding regime fragility. Western policy discourse has frequently assumed that sustained external pressure—whether economic or military—would generate internal fragmentation within the Iranian political system. However, comparative and historical evidence does not support this assumption. The institutional configuration of the Islamic Republic—combining clerical authority with security and economic structures—has exhibited considerable resilience under prolonged stress. The experience of the Iran–Iraq War is particularly instructive: despite extensive human and economic losses, the regime not only survived but consolidated its internal authority, reinforcing endurance as a central strategic principle.

The misreading of Iran is not anomalous but reflects a broader pattern in modern strategic history. During the Vietnam War, US strategy relied on escalating costs to compel North Vietnamese compliance, yet failed to account for the role of ideological commitment and nationalist mobilization, as demonstrated by Fredrik Logevall.⁶ Similarly, in the War in Afghanistan, military superiority did not translate into political control, in part because external actors misjudged the resilience and motivations of local actors, as documented by Steve Coll and Craig Whitlock.⁷

In the Iranian context, this divergence is further intensified by differences in temporal orientation. Western strategic frameworks are often constrained by short-term political cycles and immediate operational objectives. In contrast, Iranian strategy reflects a longer-term perspective shaped by revolutionary ideology and historical experience. As a result, policies designed to produce rapid behavioral change are structurally mismatched with an actor prepared to absorb sustained costs over extended periods.

The consequence is a persistent disjunction between tactical effectiveness and strategic outcome. Even where US–Israel coordination has achieved operational success, these achievements have not translated into meaningful changes in Iranian behavior. Instead, external pressure may reinforce internal cohesion and validate the regime’s narrative of resistance.

The analytical implication is therefore structural rather than contingent. The central issue is not insufficient pressure or flawed execution, but a fundamental mismatch between competing conceptions of rationality. On one side stands a deterrence model grounded in cost sensitivity and behavioral convergence; on the other, a strategic logic that incorporates ideology, endurance, and the deliberate acceptance of cost as a component of credibility.

Under these conditions, the prospect of decisive resolution becomes limited. Rather than producing capitulation or transformation, continued interaction between these frameworks is likely to generate a stable but suboptimal equilibrium. This equilibrium is characterized by ongoing confrontation, mutual cost imposition, and the absence of strategic convergence.

In other words, the most plausible outcome is not resolution but a prolonged strategic deadlock—persistent, costly, and sustained by the very assumptions that preclude its resolution.

Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).

Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold, The Gulf Military Balance, Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014).

Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).

Suzanne Maloney, Iran’s Political Economy since the Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Thierry Juneau, “Iran’s Policy Towards the Gulf: Continuity and Change,” International Affairs 91, no. 3 (2015): 625–643.

Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012).

Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Penguin Press, 2018); Craig Whitlock, The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2021).

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)