The current confrontation with Iran illustrates a persistent analytical limitation in Western strategic thought: the projection of a cost–benefit model of rationality onto actors whose decision-making frameworks are shaped by fundamentally different ideological and institutional structures. This essay argues that current US–Israel strategy misinterprets Iranian behavior by applying an inappropriate model of rationality—one that assumes cost sensitivity and behavioral convergence where neither can be reliably expected.

This limitation is particularly evident in the shared assumptions underlying US–Israel strategic coordination, where deterrence is premised on the expectation that increasing material costs will induce behavioral change. This expectation reflects the classical deterrence framework articulated by Thomas Schelling in The Strategy of Conflict, which posits that rational actors adjust their behavior in response to shifting cost structures.¹ However, a substantial body of scholarship on Iran challenges the applicability of this model. Rather than operating as a purely utility-maximizing actor, the Islamic Republic exhibits a hybrid strategic logic in which ideological legitimacy, regime preservation, and resistance to external pressure play central roles. As demonstrated in Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs, Iran’s political system integrates factional competition with a normative commitment to resistance, thereby limiting the effectiveness of coercive external pressure.²

This divergence becomes particularly salient in Iran’s strategic use of maritime geography. The role of the Strait of Hormuz has been analyzed in detail by Anthony H. Cordesman and Bryan Gold, who show that Iran’s military........

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