Debates about the current war with Iran highlight an important theoretical divide about escalation and deterrence. The argument developed by Robert A. Pape emphasizes the structural dynamics of escalation in limited wars, while Elli Lieberman offers a framework for escaping escalation traps through credibility, maneuver, and strategic restraint. Taken together, the two approaches illuminate both the causes of escalation and potential strategies for managing it.

Pape’s work, most prominently in Bombing to Win, demonstrates that coercion rarely succeeds without battlefield success. Strategies based on punishment, decapitation, or limited strikes tend to fail because they do not deny the adversary the ability to achieve its strategic objectives. In contemporary conflicts, this dynamic can generate what Pape describes as an escalation trap. Tactical successes—such as precision strikes or targeted attacks—create expectations of strategic gains that rarely materialize. When these gains fail to appear, leaders escalate further in an attempt to close the gap between military action and political outcomes. In the current confrontation with Iran, this logic suggests that repeated strikes and limited coercive actions risk widening the conflict without resolving the underlying strategic competition.

Lieberman’s analysis of the October 7 deterrence failure, as well as his other work on deterrence, offers a different perspective. Rather than focusing on structural escalation dynamics, Lieberman emphasizes the role of credibility in deterrence against state and non-state actors and hybrid adversaries. In his view, deterrence collapses when the adversary believes that the defender is unwilling to fundamentally undermine its strategy. Before October 7, for example, Hamas concluded that Israel preferred containment and conflict management to decisive action. This perception created a credibility deficit that encouraged the attack.

Lieberman argues that restoring deterrence requires breaking the adversary’s strategy through maneuver and decisive military action. Maneuver warfare forces weaker actors to abandon their preferred strategy of attrition and confrontation under conditions that favor the stronger state. However, Lieberman also warns that decisive action alone is insufficient. States must avoid overextension and prolonged wars of attrition, which tend to favor weaker actors that rely on endurance, political mobilization, and asymmetric tactics.

For this reason, Lieberman emphasizes the importance of strategic restraint and withdrawal after achieving limited military objectives. Once the adversary’s strategy has been undermined and credibility restored, remaining in the conflict can reverse the balance of resolve and recreate the conditions of an attrition war. Strategic disengagement therefore becomes a tool for preserving deterrence rather than a sign of weakness.

Applied to the war with Iran, the contrast between Pape and Lieberman becomes especially instructive. Pape’s framework highlights the dangers of escalation through repeated limited strikes that fail to produce decisive outcomes. Lieberman’s approach suggests a potential path out of this escalation dynamic. By targeting the mechanisms through which Iran projects power—such as proxy networks, missile infrastructure, and regional coercive leverage—a state can undermine Iran’s strategic approach. At the same time, avoiding territorial occupation or prolonged confrontation can prevent the conflict from degenerating into a long-term attrition struggle.

In this sense, Pape explains why escalation often occurs in modern conflicts, while Lieberman offers a strategy for escaping escalation traps. The combination of decisive action, restored credibility, and strategic restraint provides a framework for managing conflicts with hybrid adversaries while avoiding the dangers of prolonged regional war.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)