Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez (center) holds hands with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega (left) and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa (right) on June 2, 2009. Ortega and Chavez created authoritarian states that have resisted or rolled back the democratization of their countries. (Shutterstock/Harold Escalona)

What Nicaragua Can Teach Venezuela About Democratic Transitions

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Leaving former Maduro regime officials in power will increase the odds of a return to dictatorship in Venezuela.

Venezuela finds itself in an uncertain situation. The Trump administration, having ousted Nicolás Maduro and taken control of crucial oil exports, has promised democratic governance; however, it has not said how or when this transition would take place. In the meantime, it is amicably dealing with the remaining elements of the regime that has held power since Hugo Chávez first took office 27 years ago, and is focusing on encouraging US investment in the country’s dilapidated petroleum industry.

There may be room for skepticism as to whether the United States will, in fact, use its vast power to insist on a genuine democratic transition. But even if one takes President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at their word, the task that they, as well as Venezuela’s opposition, will face will be formidable as they seek to overcome decades of chavista rule. Prior to Maduro’s seizure, there were no signs that the Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela, together with the police and security service, were interested in any such transition.

This was very different from, for instance, the situation in the Southern Cone countries of Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, where in the late 1980s and early 1990s military regimes, knowing that they had lost the support of both civilian elites and the general public, and feeling that they had successfully achieved their goals, were prepared, albeit reluctantly, to return to the barracks in managed transitions.

Unlike the US interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1990), which simply swept out authoritarian rulers and replaced them with democratically oriented leaders. Instead, the United States has sought to affect events through the use of extreme pressure without maintaining a “boots on the ground” military presence. In that regard, the most analogous situation may be that of Nicaragua, where initial success in orchestrating a transition ultimately failed.

Nicaragua’s Temporary Return to Democracy

In Nicaragua, the United States both imposed a full-scale trade embargo and supported an insurgency (the so-called “contras”), which ultimately forced the Liberación Nacional (FSLN) regime, headed by Daniel Ortega, to hold elections and led to its replacement by a series of democratically elected presidents who governed for 17 years beginning in 1990.

However, in 2007, Ortega and the FSLN returned to power, and he, together with his wife, has turned the country into a brutal, personalist dictatorship. His return to power provides a cautionary tale for Venezuela, should it too pass through its own transition.

After he lost in 1990, Daniel Ortega insisted that the Sandinistas would “govern from below,” taking advantage of their strong presence in the legislature, domination of Nicaragua’s labor unions, and control of the security forces. He worked tirelessly to maintain the FSLN’s apparatus and successfully fought off efforts within the party to reform it along democratic lines. Indeed, over time, many of the original comandantes who had governed Nicaragua together with Ortega broke with him and found themselves in the political wilderness.

Meanwhile, Nicaragua saw a series of democratically elected presidents, starting with Violeta Chamorro, a conciliatory figure, whose government had to deal with the enormous task of reconstructing a country nearly destroyed by revolution, counter-revolution, Marxist mis-development, and then the “piñata” of Sandinista corruption that marked their last days in office.

She was succeeded by Arnoldo Alemán, the mayor of Managua, an old-school populist politician whose administration was marked by enormous corruption. He, in turn, was followed by business leader Enrique Bolaños, who sought to put the brakes on corruption, but lacked the flexibility to deal with an increasingly turbulent political situation. Ortega, leading the FSLN, ran unsuccessfully in each race until the November 2006 election, when he defeated the non-Sandinista parties, which, by then, were hopelessly divided among themselves.

Since taking office, Ortega, governing in tandem with his wife (whom he made vice president, and later “co-president”) has neutered all opposition, crudely stealing elections to the point where the FSLN, now entirely his personal vehicle, has complete control of all of the levers of power—not only the Congress and the bureaucracy but also the army, the police, the courts, and the electoral authority. The government has banned independent business groups and civil society organizations, tightened restrictions on the Catholic Church, and crushed demonstrations. 

The Resurrection of the Daniel Ortega Dictatorship

How is it that during the 17 years of democratic rule, Nicaragua failed to develop sufficient democratic antibodies to resist Ortega’s authoritarian drive once he returned to power? First and foremost, the governments that succeeded Ortega starting in 1989 were never able to thoroughly change out the leadership of key institutions—the military, the police, the judiciary, and the electoral authority. This was perhaps inevitable. The Sandinistas had agreed to hold free elections and then leave office in large measure in response to American power—but this was power wielded from a long distance.

By contrast, in Panama, an American army disarmed the country’s armed forces, leaving the newly installed civilian government in a position to rebuild them from scratch as a police force with very different personnel and doctrine. The replacement of the FSLN rule with democratic governance also differed greatly from contemporaneous events in Eastern Europe, where, after the fall of communism, the new authorities were able to engage in a process of “lustration,” the screening and removal of figures associated with the totalitarian past from key institutions.

However, in Nicaragua, FSLN control of these institutions remained intact. Notably, Humberto Ortega, Daniel’s brother, remained head of the armed forces until 1995. While hardline opponents of the Sandinistas in Washington expressed concern about leaving their security infrastructure intact, the argument that the new government, taking over a country in ruins, could not insist on personnel changes held sway. The assent of the Sandinistas was crucial to a peaceful transition, rather than a renewed civil war.

Ironically, during the democratic period, considerable progress was made in reforming Nicaragua’s military. It was shrunk from its outsized dimensions inherited from efforts to suppress the counterinsurgency. Its name was changed to the “Army of Nicaragua,” reflecting its new, apolitical role. It developed links with and accepted training and education from American and European counterparts. Its naval element in particular worked closely with US law enforcement on interdicting narcotics off Nicaragua’s coasts.

Similarly, the “Sandinista Police” was renamed the “National Police” and its practices were reformed. In fact, its previous role in maintaining political control at the neighborhood level became transformed into widely praised community policing equipment from the United States and elsewhere. But the fate of Nicaragua’s judicial system, never strong, was less encouraging. Reportedly, before giving up power, a number of FSLN party functionaries were granted dubious law degrees and appointed to judicial and prosecutorial positions. At the same time, the Sandinistas and government officials made appointments as part of a political horse-trade.

Although it had seemed that the military and police had embraced their roles in a democratic Nicaragua, they made no effort to push back against authoritarian rule after Ortega’s return to power. In retrospect, this ought not to have surprised anyone, given that the senior leadership of these institutions was almost all figures from Ortega’s previous period in power, and indeed, many had been guerrilla fighters during the revolution. And as the army and police remained supine, Ortega and his wife made legal changes to consolidate their rule, ensuring that those in key positions were personally loyal to them.

How Venezuela Can Avoid Nicaragua’s Mistakes

In any transition, Venezuela will face similar dilemmas. After 27 years in power, the current regime has thoroughly taken over all of the security forces. After entering office, Hugo Chávez, himself a military man with deep knowledge of the armed forces’ personnel, sent home on permanent paid leave those senior officers regarding whom he had doubts, while making sure those who remained were loyal to his project (and received their share of the burgeoning corruption).

The National Guard, most local police forces, the judiciary, and the prosecution service were politicized. The FBI-equivalent was converted into the “Bolivarian National Intelligence Service” (SEBIN), a secret police force tasked with thwarting all opposition. It took over an unfinished spiral-shaped shopping center known as “El Helicoide.”

Should a transition to a democratic government occur, the existing regime will seek to retain the same bastions of power as its Nicaraguan counterpart, with the same goal of eventually regaining control of the state. And with no US troops on the ground, the opposition, desperate to get to elections, may feel it will have little choice but to cede to such demands. Nonetheless, while a wholesale purge and restructuring may be too much to ask for, Venezuela’s democratic forces will need to be tough and gain footholds in these bodies.

At a minimum, they ought to seek the retirement of the worst human rights violators in them and the abolition of the SEBIN secret police. They should also press for the return to active duty in positions of responsibility of officers with democratic backgrounds who have been removed. They should also seek some measure of accountability for crimes committed by these entities, if not actual trials (the outgoing regime will doubtlessly demand wholesale amnesty before agreeing to elections), then at least some kind of “truth commission” was set up in other Latin American countries after their return to democracy.

One pitfall of a transition may be a demand by the current regime to maintain control of key ministries, such as defense and interior, as part of a power-sharing agreement. Ceding these positions, even if the presidency were to go to a figure from the democratic opposition, could be extremely dangerous, as they would likely become bases for subverting any nascent post-authoritarian government. Similarly, sufficient positions on the Supreme Court and the National Electoral Council must be provided to democratic forces to ensure impartial decisions.

The next few months may see personnel shifts within the governing regime. There has been a report of a proposal within the armed forces to replace the current defense minister, General Vladimir Padrino López, and to undertake a broader reorganization for democratic governance. We have seen the release of some, but not all, political prisoners and greater space for public demonstrations. These measures should be welcomed, of course, but at the same time, the opposition will need to be alert to changes that are merely cosmetic, while still leaving power in the hands of authoritarian figures.

Steady US Pressure on Venezuela Will Be Key to the Transition

Opposition demands for institutional reform must be pressed ahead of elections. The extent to which they can be forced upon the current regime will depend in large measure on the US government. While it may not have a presence in Venezuela beyond the embassy currently being set up in Caracas, the United States has near-complete control over Venezuela’s economy, including the public budget, because it requires that all oil be sold on world markets through American channels at US discretion.

Right now, it is not clear when or indeed if the United States will push hard for elections, as its priority seems to be opening up Venezuela’s oil sector to American investment. But even assuming American pressure will lead to elections and, with them, a new government, that will not be enough. Some measure of control over the security forces and other key institutions must be guaranteed in advance. Otherwise, democratic rule in Venezuela could become like that in Nicaragua—a mere interregnum between dictatorships.

About the Author: Richard Sanders

Richard M. Sanders is a senior fellow, Western Hemisphere, at the Center for the National Interest. A former member of the Senior Foreign Service of the Department of State, he served as economic counselor at the US Embassy in Venezuela, 2002–05, and as deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Nicaragua, 2007–10.

© The National Interest