With the End of the New START Treaty, Nuclear Anarchy Has Arrived

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The vacuum left by the expiration of the New START Treaty offers the United States a rare chance to lead a multilateral reset of nuclear arms control.

The New START Treaty, the last binding agreement limiting the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, expired on February 5, 2026. For more than half a century, since the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the early 1970s, American and Soviet (later Russian) leaders had operated under some form of negotiated restraint on their most powerful weapons.

That era has now ended. There are no longer legal caps on deployed strategic warheads, no mandatory data exchanges, no on-site inspections, and no regular forum, such as the Bilateral Consultative Commission, to address compliance concerns or resolve disputes.

President Donald Trump has described the lapse as an opportunity to work toward a “new, improved, and modernized treaty,” and emphasized the need to include China in future arrangements. Russia, for its part, proposed last year that both sides voluntarily observe the old numerical limits for an additional year, though without verification measures, and Washington has not formally accepted. The result is a vacuum: the world’s two largest nuclear powers can, in principle, upload additional warheads onto existing delivery systems with no transparency or agreed boundaries.

This is more than the loss of one agreement. It represents the collapse of a bilateral, bipolar arms-control architecture built for a world that no longer exists. This framework presumes two main players with similar strength and a mutual desire for predictability. We currently operate in a tripolar, increasingly complex, polycentric world.

China’s nuclear arsenal has grown rapidly, with projections indicating approximately 600 warheads by 2025. Both the US Department of Defense and independent sources project that it could reach 1,500 by 2035. Beijing’s expansion includes new silo fields, mobile ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers capable of reaching the US mainland. Unlike the Soviet buildup during the Cold War, which was slower and more predictable, China’s modernization occurs amid rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

The risks escalate rapidly. Without verification, both Washington and Moscow must prepare for the worst-case scenarios. The US Minuteman III missiles and Trident II submarine missiles still have plenty of room to add more warheads. They were set up with just one each to comply with old treaty limits, but those extra warheads can be reinstated if needed. Russia’s newer missiles, such as the Sarmat and Yars, work the same way—they’re built to carry multiple warheads.

Without data exchanges or inspections, each side will assume the other is maximizing its force, creating a cycle of action and reaction, even if neither side aims to escalate.

Emerging technologies intensify the severity of the issue. Hypersonic glide vehicles, fractional orbital bombardment systems, cyber vulnerabilities in command-and-control networks, AI-powered early warning systems, and space-based sensors all reduce decision-making time. A typical crisis, whether in Europe or Asia, now presents a higher nuclear risk because it’s more difficult to tell apart nuclear from non-nuclear threats. Dual-capable platforms further obscure these distinctions, increasing the risk of miscalculation: a conventional missile launched for conventional reasons might be mistaken for the start of a nuclear conflict.

Non-nuclear states will take notice as the next NPT Review Conference gathers in New York from April 27 to May 22, 2026. Delegates from the Global South and non-aligned nations will question why nuclear-weapon states expect them to uphold non-proliferation commitments while these powers relax their own restrictions. The core bargain of the NPT—disarmament in return for non-proliferation—appears more fragile than ever.

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The United States, using its worldwide alliances, advanced technology, and strong military, has a distinctive ability to shape future events. Rather than sticking to old bilateral treaties, Washington should pursue a practical, future-focused approach.

First, announce a unilateral six-month moratorium on adding more warheads beyond existing levels, and openly encourage Russia and China to do the same. This action requires minimal effort—US nuclear forces are already operating well below their maximum capacity—and shifts the pressure for escalation onto others, providing more time for diplomatic efforts.

Second, propose a new multilateral framework, starting with a US-Russia-China minilateral dialogue. This should aim to cap total warheads (strategic and non-strategic), verified through a mix of national technical means, commercial satellite imagery, and AI-enhanced remote monitoring—building on lessons from Open Skies and existing confidence-building measures. Providing enough transparency to alleviate worst-case fears could prove sufficient here.

Third, integrate emerging domains by setting rules or alerts for cyber-nuclear interactions, space assets, and hypersonic systems to avoid accidental escalation. Advancements may be linked to de-escalation efforts in Ukraine, the Middle East, or East Asia, and negative security assurances or conventional arms-control incentives may be offered to motivate China’s involvement.

President Trump has frequently expressed a desire for fewer nuclear weapons and a more secure world. The end of New START should be viewed as an opportunity for renewal. By shifting from old bilateral deals to a sustainable, inclusive multilateral approach, the United States can help stop the slide into nuclear chaos.

About the Author: Eric Alter

Eric Alter is the dean of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi, a professor of international law and diplomacy, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. A former United Nations civil servant and a senior consultant/team leader with various international organisations such as the WTO, the World Bank, IFC, UNDP, UNEP, and FAO, Professor Alter has been seconded abroad and worked with embassies in an advisory capacity, in particular in Aden, Beirut, and Cairo. He received his PhD from Paris I Pantheon-Sorbonne, is an alumnus of the Institute of Higher International Studies of Paris II Pantheon-Assas, and holds an LLM in Entertainment and Media Law from Southwestern Law School.

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© The National Interest