Originating from Afghanistan, driven by unprovoked aggression, waves of terrorism refuse to die off, forcing Pakistan to launch Operation Ghazab lil Haq near the end of February.

Pakistan had put two choices in front of the Kabul regime. First, take decisive action against militants who had been using Afghan soil to attack Pakistan. Second, face retributive retaliation. By all indications, the Kabul regime opted for the latter.

The challenge confronting Pakistan is that the Kabul regime is neither a regular, conventional government nor an elected one. Instead, it is a hodgepodge of disparate militant groups claiming together ascendancy to Kabul by dint of enjoying a monopoly over the barrel of the gun. Their major shared claims are that they weathered the foreign troops on Afghan land and that they sacrificed the blood of kin and next of kin to reach this day. The blood spilt in due course offers the main entitlement. Their major success is survival: they have survived to see the light of freedom from foreign occupation.

Even donating the word “government” to the Kabul regime is unnecessary because the ruling apparatus lacks any experience of running a government for two decades (2001–2021). The hiatus of twenty years living in the wilderness, away from a disciplined and punctual life, is quite damning—explanatory in its own right. As stranded subjects, they did not learn how to be a shadow government, preparing themselves for running any next show. Instead, they had no idea when the foreign occupation would end. Similarly, as marooned creatures on their own land, they did not take lessons in democracy and the constitution, or women’s rights, to say the least. Instead, they trained themselves to be ruthless and vicious. Their leaders kept them bloodthirsty to win battles.

In two decades of resistance, they learnt how to attack and disperse, not how to organise people for economic activity or how to run organisations and systems for the collective benefit of society. In fact, the components of the Kabul regime learnt how to pull down a system to its knees.

The Doha Accord is quite instructive. Though Pakistan claims to have facilitated initial meetings between the Afghan Taliban and the United States in Doha (Qatar), Pakistan does not reveal the reason for not arranging such parleys in Islamabad. Pakistan could not host the meetings. The venue in a third country was indicative of the independence of the negotiating parties, though they needed an interlocutor to break the ice. In this account, one can find the reason for Pakistan’s helplessness today.

Signed in February 2020, the Doha Accord was officially named the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan. One important provision of the accord was to establish an interim government which would hold elections to hand over power to elected leaders. It is now more than four years (from August 2021 to date) without any sign of elections being held for the expected transition. Instead, the interim set-up has been continuing in violation of the accord. Pakistan is not raising this issue at the international level. Though Pakistan is not a party to the accord, nor does it pertain to it directly whether or not the Kabul regime holds elections, the impact of an unelected government in Kabul is affecting Pakistan inimically. One of the disastrous consequences is that Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have deteriorated to the extent that Pakistan has had to cross the Pak-Afghan border in hot pursuit.

A couple of days ago, taking a retributive measure, Pakistan’s air force entered Afghanistan’s airspace and launched missiles at militant hideouts of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), wreaking damage on infrastructure. Reportedly, non-combatants (civilians), including children, lost their lives in collateral damage. Moreover, Pakistan’s ground forces destroyed around 200 check posts, 200 tanks, and armoured vehicles. The air force targeted 51 locations in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. Pakistan claims to hold around 32 sq km of area under its sway in the Zhob sector. Both countries are now in an open war. This is a bad omen. Pakistan has refused to hold fire.

In Afghanistan, the repair or replacement of destroyed infrastructure is not swift. It takes months or years to do so, as Afghanistan is also in the eye of a financial storm. On top of it, the Kabul regime deems it fit to confront Pakistan while forgetting that the major chunk of its trade with the world is possible through seaports in Pakistan. Apparently, avoiding financial constraints is not a priority for Afghanistan. That said, the war with Afghanistan is bound to affect the economy of both warring countries. Afghanistan has other means, including illicit drug trade, whereas Pakistan has no such option.

With hostility simmering, Pakistan enters into a perpetual war against Afghanistan. Pakistan has expressed its resolve to prolong the war until the backbone of the TTP is broken. It means a long haul. With a huge population to feed, Pakistan’s economy will have to stretch its boundaries further. This is not an easy task, as the Middle East is lighting up with air strikes. The fear of closing the Strait of Hormuz is bound to increase oil prices, which are a major source of indirect tax collection. Any rise in oil prices is bound to drive up the prices of imported medicine and food items necessary for daily survival.

As if this were not enough, Pakistan is expecting the spillover effect of the conflict engulfing Iran into its fold. Moreover, the south-western province, Balochistan, is in turmoil, ravaged by a low-intensity insurgency.

This simply means that Pakistan has to play its cards right. Since February 2024 (when the last general elections were held), it has taken two years to stabilise the economy. The wave of destabilisation is approaching Pakistan fast from its western border. Pakistan has to weigh its options: whether it wants to remain embroiled in a conflict with Afghanistan or keep its economy stabilised.

Dr. Tehmina Aslam RanjhaThe writer is an analyst on National Security and Counter-Terrorism. She tweets @TA_Ranjha and can be reached at taranjha1@gmail.com

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