In her recent meeting with families of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi clarified her position that she is willing to meet Kim Jong Un face-to-face to resolve outstanding issues between the two countries. This week, the Kim regime indirectly offered its response during the ninth congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea.

The once-every-five-year party congress took place over the course of a week, reviewing policy implementation over the past half decade and establishing the country’s direction for the next. None of the reporting from the congress explicitly mentioned Japan, but there were clear signals that will dash the hopes that Takaichi and her administration may have had for dialogue with North Korea. Instead, the party congress indicated that absent a fundamental change in Japan’s policy interests, Takaichi’s near-term efforts lie more in engagement with Washington and Seoul than with Pyongyang.

The party congress has been a rare political-level meeting in North Korea. Although the regime under Kim has sought to regularize it, this was only the ninth event of its kind since 1946. Typically, the congress has served as a tool to consolidate power, to reinforce the regime’s strategic vision and to set near— to mid-term goals for the country.

The Ninth Party Congress was the third of Kim’s reign and it proved to be more evolutionary than revolutionary in its policy pronouncements. Rather than offering any groundbreaking new direction, the congress focused on formalizing sustainable institutions and policymaking processes. There was a notable shift in personnel, reshuffling Kim’s old mentors and advisers to his generational and institutional allies. The congress also called for a continuation of the same sort of economic development and military modernization initiatives that have already been under way the past few years.

There was some clear signaling to external powers; namely, the United States and South Korea. In the final congress report, there was a renewed message to the White House that Pyongyang is ready to normalize relations if the United States accepts North Korea’s status as a sovereign, nuclear-armed state.

The Kim regime also unequivocally signaled to South Korea that the old inter-Korean policy paradigm is gone and that there is no room for engagement. Pyongyang rejected the Lee Jae Myung administration’s attempt to revive past agreements and indirectly criticized its unwillingness to abandon unification as a policy objective.

The Kim regime did not explicitly name other countries in its Ninth Party Congress reporting, only briefly alluding to them in its foreign-policy stance. They noted that the country will “develop the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation with neighboring countries,” which means China and Russia. They also stated that North Korea will “strengthen the relations with anti-imperialist independent countries,” which translates to their intent to engage with countries that are not within the U.S. alliance network.

So, how does this all affect Japan?

First, the prospects for direct diplomacy between Japan and North Korea remain slim. North Korea has given no space for engagement on the issues most relevant to Japan — that is, the abductee issue and denuclearization. For engagement to happen, the Takaichi administration would have to abandon denuclearization as a policy objective and be willing to handle the abduction issue quietly and behind closed doors. Given that much of Japanese security practice over the past 30 years has centered on the North Korean nuclear threat and because the abduction issue is such a high visibility policy objective, Pyongyang’s enduring position toward Tokyo still creates too wide of a gap to cross.

Second, Takaichi must recognize that the outcomes of this congress will affect cooperation with South Korea. The Lee administration was hoping that the Ninth Party Congress might present some window of opportunity for inter-Korean engagement, but Pyongyang was clear in its rejection of inter-Korean ties. This is going to create intensified internal debate within the South Korean government as pro-engagement policy actors will demand a major adjustment to the country’s security and foreign-policy posture in an attempt to pry open the door to diplomacy with North Korea.

The Takaichi administration should expect the pragmatists within the Lee administration — namely, national security adviser Wi Sung-lac and Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back — to continue advocating for deepened ties with Japan. Meanwhile, Tokyo must be cautious of growing voices from influential officials like Unification Minister Chung Dong-young who will advocate for abandonment of any security or diplomatic cooperation that Pyongyang may view as confrontational. Chung is likely to include security cooperation between Japan and South Korea as part of this debate.

Finally, the Takaichi administration must brace itself for the Donald Trump White House to reach out to the Kim regime. Since Trump’s return to the Oval Office, White House officials have tried to rekindle engagement between Washington and Pyongyang, first through diplomatic communique and then through invitations to meet while the U.S. president was in Gyeongju, South Korea, for the APEC Summit that began last October. The precondition that the U.S. abandon denuclearization may seem like an insurmountable hurdle, but there will invariably be voices in Washington who advocate for abandonment of that policy objective given the practical realities of North Korea’s existing nuclear arsenal.

Trump has already restated his position that he is willing to meet Kim anywhere and without preconditions. With North Korea’s recent signal and Trump’s self-proclaimed label as “Peacemaker-in-Chief,” the Takaichi administration should expect the White House to seek an opportunity for another Trump-Kim summit, possibly tied to the president’s scheduled visit to China at the end of this month.

Now is the time for Tokyo to be direct with Washington on its interests related to North Korea. If denuclearization of North Korea is still an indispensable policy objective, the Takaichi administration must be resolute on that point with a clear explanation of the potential costs that may come from abandoning this position in favor of near-term engagement.

Whatever other goals Japan may have vis-a-vis North Korea should also be clearly articulated to Washington so that when the White House inevitably reaches out to Pyongyang, it does so with its allies’ interests in hand. Although working level officials should already be doing this, the forthcoming summit between Takaichi and Trump will be the place to finalize positions related to North Korea.

Meanwhile, if Takaichi hopes to continue deepening ties with South Korea, her administration will need to move quickly to expand cooperation further in nonsecurity realms. With their next meeting set to happen in the coming weeks, it will be important to move forward on deliverables in economic, diplomatic and person-to-person areas.

Beyond this, there is not much the Takaichi administration can hope for from Pyongyang based on the outcomes of the Ninth Party Congress. Given the enduring policy stalemate, Tokyo must prepare for a protracted period in which deterrence and alliance management take precedence over any near-term diplomatic breakthrough. If Takaichi is serious about protecting her government’s positions related to denuclearization and resolution of the abductee issue, she will need to pair her openness to dialogue with steady and unambiguous defense of these interests. In this way, her near-term objective is to hold the line in hopes that the other parties involved can somehow move the ball forward.

© The Japan Times