What is unfolding across the Gulf is not just another episode of regional instability; it is a structural shock that is forcing governments, investors, and citizens to rethink long-held assumptions about security, prosperity, and alliances. The idea that parts of the Gulf could remain insulated from the conflicts of the wider Middle East is now being tested in real time—and found wanting.

First, Gulf states should begin to recognise that the presence of foreign military bases on their soil is not exactly what they bargained for. For decades, these bases were seen as a deterrent, a guarantee that external powers would step in if the region’s security was threatened. Today, however, the reality looks very different. Drone and missile attacks are occurring almost daily, and these bases are no longer just symbols of protection; they are also targets.

This shift in perception matters. Citizens in Gulf states are increasingly likely to view the continued presence of foreign forces not as a safeguard but as a risk factor. While governments may be slow to react publicly, the pressure to reassess these arrangements will grow, and something will eventually have to give.

Second, and perhaps more worrying from a strategic standpoint, is the perception that the US is not coming to the defence of its traditional allies, at least not in the way that many had expected. Whether this perception is entirely accurate is less important than the fact that it exists and is gaining traction. For many in the region, it now appears that they are being left to fend for themselves.

This has profound implications. Security doctrines that were built around external guarantees will need to be revisited. In this context, Saudi Arabia’s mutual defence relationship with Pakistan may acquire renewed importance, offering an alternative or supplementary framework for cooperation in an increasingly uncertain environment.

Third, the reputational damage to Gulf city-states such as Dubai and Qatar is likely to be significant. These cities have spent years, even decades, cultivating an image of being safe, stable oases in an otherwise troubled region. That image has now been shattered—particularly in the case of Dubai, which had positioned itself as virtually immune to regional turmoil.

Perception is everything in the global economy, especially for cities that rely heavily on tourism, finance, and expatriate talent. Once that perception of safety is undermined, it is not easily restored. Rebuilding trust will take time, sustained effort, and, above all, a demonstrable return to stability.

Gulf states will need to invest more heavily in their own defence capabilities—developing indigenous capacity, enhancing training, and improving coordination among their forces

Gulf states will need to invest more heavily in their own defence capabilities—developing indigenous capacity, enhancing training, and improving coordination among their forces

Fourth, there will be a knock-on effect on the expatriate populations that the Gulf states have long sought to attract. Highly skilled professionals from Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are not bound to the region; they have options. In the current climate, it is reasonable to expect that many will hesitate before returning, if they return at all. Competing destinations such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and even Istanbul offer comparable economic opportunities with a perception of greater safety. This shift could have serious implications for sectors in the Gulf that depend on foreign expertise and talent.

Fifth, countries in proximity to the Gulf that have historically struggled with image problems may find that this moment presents an unexpected opportunity. In a region where stability has suddenly become a scarce commodity, those who remain relatively unscathed by the conflict can reposition themselves. Pakistan is a particularly good example.

Long viewed through the lens of its internal challenges, it now has an opening to improve its image perception. This is not an automatic process; it will require careful messaging, policy consistency, and tangible improvements on the ground. But the opportunity exists, and it is one that should be actively pursued.

Sixth, the region’s aviation sector is likely to undergo a major transformation. The Gulf has been home to some of the world’s busiest airports and most important transit hubs, with Dubai Airport ranking as the second busiest globally for the past two years. Any sustained disruption to these hubs will create ripple effects across global travel and logistics networks.

Surrounding countries stand to benefit if they can move quickly and strategically. Pakistan, for instance, could attempt to capture a portion of this displaced traffic, but doing so would require significant upgrades in infrastructure, service quality, and reliability. The gap between demand and supply that is likely to emerge in the near future presents a real, albeit challenging, opportunity.

Seventh, and as a logical consequence of the first point, the security architecture of the region may inevitably change. The era of near-total dependence on Western protection appears increasingly uncertain. Gulf states will need to invest more heavily in their own defence capabilities—developing indigenous capacity, enhancing training, and improving coordination among their forces. At the same time, there is a strong case for greater regional collaboration.

Countries such as Turkiye and Pakistan, working alongside Saudi Arabia, could play a key role in the formation of a multinational West Asian security alliance. Such an arrangement would not replace existing partnerships overnight, but it could provide a more balanced and regionally rooted framework for collective security.

Finally, a note of praise for the way Pakistan has handled the current situation. Credit should be given where it is due. Islamabad has adopted a measured and balanced approach, navigating a highly complex and volatile environment with a degree of diplomatic agility. It has expressed condolences for the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, commiserated with his son, the new Supreme Leader, and also extended congratulations, signalling respect and continuity in its engagement with Iran.

At the same time, it has condemned both the attacks on Iran and Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Gulf states, maintaining a principled stance against escalation. Pakistan has also remained actively engaged at the diplomatic level. It has been in contact with Iran’s leadership on multiple occasions and, along with countries such as Oman, Egypt, and Turkiye, is playing a mediatory role in an effort to bring the conflict to a mutually acceptable conclusion.

Simultaneously, it has maintained close coordination with Saudi Arabia at the highest levels, exemplified by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s recent visit to meet Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. All of this has taken place while Pakistan continues to manage its own security challenges on the western border with the Afghan Taliban—a reminder that its diplomatic efforts are being conducted under considerable strain.

Taken together, these trends point to a region in transition. The old assumptions no longer hold, and the new equilibrium has yet to fully emerge. What is clear, however, is that the Gulf, and its wider neighbourhood, is entering a period of recalibration. Those who recognise this shift early and adapt accordingly will be better positioned to navigate the uncertainties that lie ahead.

© The Friday Times