As the saying goes, “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” Yet even as the final differences in the Iran deal continue to be worked out between Washington and Tehran—through Pakistan’s military and political leadership—the direction is now clear. In Islamabad, the signs are unmistakable: heightened security, a city being prepared, schools closed, and an unusually intense diplomatic tempo.

President Trump has gone beyond signalling—he has indicated that a deal is close and that talks may resume imminently. In that context, it is no longer far-fetched to imagine him arriving here soon, alongside Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, to conclude what could become the defining agreement of this conflict.

What has brought the process to this point is not broad convergence, but the narrowing of disagreement. The framework is largely understood. The remaining issues are specific: the disposition of roughly 440–450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent, and the duration and form of enrichment limits.

Washington has pushed for removal or long-term restriction; Tehran has argued for retention under monitoring and a shorter horizon. The space for compromise is now visible—transfer, dilution, or monitored retention of sensitive material, combined with a suspension or moratorium on enrichment. The fact that both sides are negotiating these details—not the framework itself—shows how far the process has already advanced.

This stage did not emerge suddenly in Islamabad. Pakistan had already worked out key contours before the first round began. Both delegations arrived prepared, with structured positions, technical teams, and multiple working tracks. The discussions moved quickly into committees—nuclear, sanctions, regional security, and ceasefire stabilisation—under an overarching political channel.

That is why the talks did not collapse when they paused. The groundwork had already been laid. Pakistan has remained ahead of the curve throughout—shaping modalities before talks, sustaining momentum during them, and narrowing gaps after them.

The ceasefire itself was not an accident. It was secured through direct engagement by Pakistan at the highest level. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s intervention helped align key actors, including Tehran’s security establishment, at a moment when escalation seemed imminent. What followed was not simply a pause in hostilities, but a managed de-escalation: Lebanon stabilised, Hezbollah’s posture adjusted, and escalation pathways were contained.

At the same time, Iran’s decision to reopen the Strait of Hormuz during the ceasefire reflects a calculated shift. Hormuz had become Tehran’s principal lever. The U.S. response—naval pressure without permanent disruption—was designed to neutralise that leverage. The result is now visible: pressure has given way to negotiation.

If the agreement is concluded in Islamabad, it will mark more than the end of a war. It will mark the point at which diplomacy—backed by credible pressure and precise execution—reshaped a conflict that had long resisted settlement

If the agreement is concluded in Islamabad, it will mark more than the end of a war. It will mark the point at which diplomacy—backed by credible pressure and precise execution—reshaped a conflict that had long resisted settlement

The Gulf dimension has been built into the deal from the outset. If Iran seeks guarantees against another war with the United States and Israel, Saudi Arabia and the GCC seek assurances against renewed Iranian pressure in the Gulf. Pakistan’s diplomacy has bridged this divide in real time.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s engagement with Riyadh and Doha, combined with sustained coordination with Türkiye and Egypt, has ensured that regional security is not an afterthought but a core pillar of the emerging framework. This is no longer a narrow nuclear deal. It is a broader attempt to stabilise the Gulf security environment.

This is where President Trump’s approach comes into focus. His presidency has consistently projected a willingness to take risks for high-impact deals rather than manage prolonged conflict. From positioning himself as a peacemaker to launching initiatives such as the Board of Peace—of which Pakistan became an early participant—his method has been clear: apply pressure, create leverage, and then close decisively. In this case, economic pressure, maritime signalling, and direct engagement have created the conditions. But pressure alone does not produce outcomes. It requires partners who can deliver.

Pakistan has done precisely that. Field Marshal Munir has demonstrated a style that aligns closely with Trump’s own instincts: direct, outcome-oriented, and willing to act under pressure. While in Tehran, key shifts occurred—on Lebanon, on Hormuz, and on the nuclear track. At the same time, Pakistan’s political leadership ensured alignment across the Gulf. This combination of military credibility and political coordination has allowed Pakistan to do what few states can—engage adversaries simultaneously, manage competing interests, and produce tangible results.

This is why President Trump should come to Islamabad if the final terms are agreed. It would not simply be symbolic. It would acknowledge a reality already recognised in Washington—that Pakistan has been central to moving the process forward. It would also give the agreement political weight and credibility at a critical moment. Iran’s core concern is not only the terms of a deal, but whether it will hold. A presidential presence at the point of conclusion would change that calculation.

There is also a larger strategic opening. If this framework holds, it could create space for addressing deeper regional conflicts, including the long-standing Palestinian issue. A reduction in U.S.–Iran confrontation, stabilisation of the Gulf, and containment of proxy theatres would remove key structural obstacles that have sustained instability across the Middle East. This does not resolve those issues automatically, but it makes progress possible in a way that prolonged conflict never could.

Pakistan’s role in this moment reflects a longer pattern. It facilitated the opening between the United States and China in the early 1970s. It played a role in the diplomatic processes that ended the Cold War phase in Afghanistan. It supported the Doha framework decades later. Today, it has brought Washington and Tehran to direct engagement after nearly half a century of hostility. This continuity is not incidental. It reflects a diplomatic capacity that becomes visible in moments of crisis.

There are still risks. The final decisions on the nuclear file remain politically sensitive. Domestic pressures exist on both sides. Israel remains uneasy with any arrangement that reduces military pressure without a full strategic rollback of Iran’s capabilities. But the process has moved beyond uncertainty into a decision. The gaps are defined. The mechanisms are in place. The momentum is real.

If the agreement is concluded in Islamabad, it will mark more than the end of a war. It will mark the point at which diplomacy—backed by credible pressure and precise execution—reshaped a conflict that had long resisted settlement. And if President Trump comes to seal it, it will confirm what is already evident: that this outcome is not accidental, but the result of a rare convergence between a risk-taking peacemaker in Washington and a delivering partner in Islamabad.

© The Friday Times