As the US–Israel war on Iran enters a critical phase, Pakistan is being named in the exchanges taking place between Washington and Tehran. Iranian officials have confirmed that US messages are reaching them through “friendly states”, with Pakistan mentioned alongside Türkiye and Egypt. Around the same time, a US proposal to end the war was conveyed to Tehran through Pakistani intermediaries. Islamabad has also been discussed as a possible venue for talks.

One country, despite its size, economic weight and global ambitions, is missing from this chain. India’s visible involvement amounts to a single call between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Donald Trump.

Over a 72-hour window from March 22 to 25, Pakistan’s diplomatic activity tells a different story. General Asim Munir spoke with President Trump. The next day, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar remained in contact with Abbas Araghchi and counterparts in Türkiye, Egypt and Qatar, while also briefing Arab officials in Riyadh.

Additional contacts among intelligence channels remain undisclosed. All of these were not symbolic gestures but part of a coordinated effort linking Washington and Tehran through multiple channels at a moment when direct engagement remained constrained.

India does not appear in this sequence. There are no reports of Indian officials speaking to Tehran during this period, no indication of India conveying messages between Washington and Iran, and no mention of New Delhi in discussions about venues or frameworks. The call to Washington stands alone.

That absence carries weight because India is not a marginal actor. It is the world’s fifth-largest economy and has spent a decade projecting itself as an emerging global power. Yet in a crisis unfolding in its extended neighbourhood, it is not part of the exchanges that matter.

At the same time, Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership was engaged in round-the-clock exchanges—linking Washington and Tehran while coordinating with Türkiye, Egypt and Gulf actors—Prime Minister Narendra Modi received a call from President Trump on March 24.

The content of that call, as described by US officials, was routine: discussion on keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, regional stability, and de-escalation—similar to Trump’s outreach to other world leaders amid global energy concerns. PM Modi described it as a “useful exchange”, but the substance placed India as a concerned stakeholder, not a participant shaping outcomes.

India has long presented itself as a bridge between the West and the Islamic world. Yet when a situation arises that requires precisely that role, it is Pakistan that is being used

India has long presented itself as a bridge between the West and the Islamic world. Yet when a situation arises that requires precisely that role, it is Pakistan that is being used

The attempt by Indian officials and media to project this as strategic involvement stands in contrast to the reality that communication between the principal actors was moving through Pakistan.

Pakistan’s position is not accidental. It rests on geography and sustained engagement. It shares a 900-kilometre border with Iran and hosts one of the world’s largest Shia populations, creating a natural societal linkage with Tehran. It has maintained working relations with Iran, while also retaining strategic access in Washington and deep defence ties with its most trusted allies, Saudi Arabia and China.

Since the early 1990s, Pakistan has also hosted Iran’s interests section in Washington, providing a formal channel in the absence of direct US–Iran diplomatic relations.

This combination allows Pakistan to remain in contact with Washington, Tehran, Riyadh and China at the same time without being locked into any one axis. Few countries operate across these divides with similar access, and few have demonstrated the ability to cultivate personal rapport across such diverse global and regional actors as Pakistan under its current leadership.

The present moment builds on earlier developments. In June 2025, General Asim Munir was hosted by a sitting US president at the White House for an extended private meeting that included a discussion of Iran. That engagement followed Pakistan’s role in the May 2025 India–Pakistan crisis, where a ceasefire was publicly linked by Trump to US intervention.

Pakistan acknowledged that involvement; India rejected it. The contrast was noted in Washington. Pakistan has since maintained that access while keeping working ties with Tehran and coordination with Gulf capitals.

There is a deeper structural layer to this. The partition placed Pakistan along the entire north-western frontier bordering Afghanistan and Iran. Since then, instability along this arc has repeatedly drawn Pakistan into the centre of international engagement. It has borne the consequences in the form of conflict spillover, militancy and economic strain. At the same time, it has become the country that external powers turn to when access or communication is required.

This pattern is not new. Before 9/11, India signalled readiness to support US operations, including offering unconditional military support. When the Afghanistan campaign began, it was Pakistan—despite its prior links with the Taliban—that became central to US strategy in the War on Terror. The reason was not preference but geography. Pakistan bordered the conflict zone and controlled access routes. The same logic is visible again.

India lies outside that frontier. Its access depends on political relationships rather than geography. Over time, those relationships have narrowed. India invested in Chabahar Port as a route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, but the project stalled after US sanctions decisions in 2025. At the same time, India strengthened ties with Israel, including defence agreements signed shortly before the current war. These choices have reduced its room to engage Iran.

There is an additional irony. India has long presented itself as a bridge between the West and the Islamic world. Yet when a situation arises that requires precisely that role, it is Pakistan that is being used. The contrast has not gone unnoticed within India, both before and now.

India’s current diplomatic failure, amid the global spotlight on Pakistan in the Iran war, has drawn sharp criticism across its political spectrum, particularly from Congress leaders. Rahul Gandhi has described it as the outcome of “PM Modi’s personal foreign policy”, remarking that “everybody considers this a universal joke”, a pointed reference to India’s absence as Pakistan emerged in diplomatic exchanges on Iran.

Shashi Tharoor has warned that India’s visible tilt towards Israel since the Gaza war has narrowed its space with Iran. Senior Congress leader P. Chidambaram has termed it a “one-sided foreign policy”, asking, “What is wisdom? What is diplomacy? What is a bias-free foreign policy?”

While Pakistan, after decades of grappling with extremism, has been trying to move beyond its consequences and re-engage with the world, India has moved in the opposite direction, narrowing its outlook at a time when adaptability is essential

While Pakistan, after decades of grappling with extremism, has been trying to move beyond its consequences and re-engage with the world, India has moved in the opposite direction, narrowing its outlook at a time when adaptability is essential

Jairam Ramesh and Tariq Anwar have described Pakistan’s emergence as a mediator as a “severe setback” and a “rebuff”, with Anwar noting that Pakistan was playing mediator while India remained a “mute spectator”. Congress spokesperson Garima Dasauni questioned on national television why Pakistan was part of mediation efforts while India remained absent, while Pawan Khera argued that Pakistan had positioned itself at the diplomatic table during a critical global moment.

Even External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, a seasoned diplomat, has reflected this unease. When asked whether Pakistan’s role was a setback, he responded that India would not become a “dalal nation”, adding that Pakistan had long played that role. Such language from a senior diplomat signals irritation rather than confidence.

Indian television has mirrored the same anxiety. Debates on Republic TV, India Today and WION have repeatedly questioned why Pakistan, not India, was being used for back-channel diplomacy, with some describing it as Pakistan “outshining” Indian foreign policy. On The Debate with Arnab Goswami, Pakistan is dismissed as “irrelevant”, only for discussions to return to why Washington is engaging it.

On India First, its role is called “opportunistic”, yet it remains the central focus. Panellists warn of Pakistan’s “history of failed mediation” while simultaneously attacking its credibility—one bluntly stating, “Shehbaz has zero credibility”. The pattern is consistent: dismiss, then dwell.

This strain is also visible among other mainstream media voices. Barkha Dutt, who does not hide her Hindutva leanings, has framed the Iran crisis through selective narratives—tilted against the United States and aligned with Israel—while amplifying India’s limited engagement. The framing reflects obvious frustration at Pakistan’s visible role in the crisis, a reality that is perhaps difficult to digest. Even otherwise measured voices have joined in.

Suhasini Haider’s March 25 article in The Hindu drew an ill-intended comparison between Pakistan’s current role, Kissinger’s 1971 China opening, and Operation Searchlight—invoking Bangladesh’s contested Genocide Day despite the events being months apart—to cast Pakistan’s present diplomacy in a negative historical light.

This is not new. Barkha drew sharp criticism in Pakistan for misreporting facts during last year’s conflict, even as it claimed or established air and missile superiority won Chinese appreciation and American endorsement. Another well-known media figure, Major Gaurav Arya, publicly abused Iran’s foreign minister, calling him “son of a pig”, when he visited Islamabad before travelling to India in May 2025. The reaction exposed the same discomfort when Pakistan’s role intersects with wider regional diplomacy. Hurling abuses at a visiting dignitary also affects official relations.

The current crisis brings all these strands together. Pakistan is present because it has access, geography and relationships that can be used. India is absent because it lacks those advantages in this theatre. For a country seeking a larger global role, that is not an easy position to explain.

Whether the war de-escalates or expands, Pakistan stands to gain. If a ceasefire emerges through channels, it is helping sustain with Türkiye and Egypt, it will be credited for enabling contact at a critical moment. If the conflict deepens, Pakistan can still point to its role in attempting de-escalation while remaining aligned with Gulf partners if the theatre widens. In either case, it accumulates diplomatic, security and economic space in West Asia. India does not feature in any of these outcomes.

Leaving aside the compulsion of geography, a larger issue explains India’s obsession with Pakistan and its inability to compete in regional and global diplomacy. Over the past decade, it has made a conscious shift towards Hindutva as a guiding framework for both domestic and external policy.

This has hardened attitudes, reduced strategic flexibility, and turned foreign policy into an extension of identity politics. While Pakistan, after decades of grappling with extremism, has been trying to move beyond its consequences and re-engage with the world, India has moved in the opposite direction, narrowing its outlook at a time when adaptability is essential.

This has shaped its regional posture. Instead of stabilising relations with Pakistan and using geography to its advantage, India has allowed rivalry to dominate policy, sidelining South Asia, weakening mechanisms like SAARC, and limiting its ability to engage westwards.

The result is visible in crises like this: Pakistan, despite its constraints, can operate across competing camps, while India, larger and more resourced, finds itself outside the room, with unresolved issues like Kashmir anchoring its outlook in conflict rather than cooperation. These are problems India has created for itself, and only it can resolve.

© The Friday Times