Legally, Kashmir has gone through three phases. The first phase was multilateral, starting with the Indo-Pakistani war of 1947. Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir asked for Indian assistance to control the Poonch uprising, but India agreed to help if he signed the Instrument of Accession, which he did, creating the first legal impediment for Pakistan.

Thereafter, India and Pakistan signed the First Karachi Agreement in July 1949, establishing a Ceasefire Line, monitored by UN observers, and a formal ceasefire was declared on 1st January 1949.

The UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 39 established a commission for the purpose of peaceful dispute resolution. UNSC Resolution 47 increased the size of the commission and proposed a three-step process. In the first step, Pakistan would withdraw completely from Kashmir, and in the second step, India would reduce its forces.

The third step was appointing a plebiscite administrator nominated by the UN. Thereafter, UNSC Resolution 51 was adopted, and under UNSC Resolution 80, Pakistan and India were to simultaneously demilitarise Kashmir.

In the Second Karachi Agreement of 1949, the Azad Kashmir Government ceded to Pakistan complete control of Gilgit-Baltistan’s defence, foreign affairs, and communications. In the Sino-Pakistan Agreement of 1963, Pakistan accepted China’s sovereignty over the Shaksgam Valley, raising the question of whether this arrangement affects the UNSC Resolutions.

In the Delhi Agreement of 1952, Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah agreed to retain the special powers of Kashmir’s Constituent Assembly, denying property rights to non-Kashmiris, and made the Indian President’s emergency powers subject to assent from the Kashmir Government.

The Tashkent Declaration of 1966 resolved the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, and it was agreed that the Indian and Pakistani military would pull back to their pre-conflict positions; neither nation would interfere in the other’s internal affairs; and economic and diplomatic relations would be restored. It was also agreed that both sides would work towards improving bilateral relations. This demonstrated a willingness to now deal with the Kashmir dispute bilaterally.

It is not clear if the Kashmir dispute will be resolved anytime soon, but what is clear is that subsequent developments have made implementing UNSC Resolutions difficult, if not impossible

It is not clear if the Kashmir dispute will be resolved anytime soon, but what is clear is that subsequent developments have made implementing UNSC Resolutions difficult, if not impossible

The first phase, though being multilateral in nature, enabled Pakistan to present the case of the people of Kashmir and their right to self-determination legally and legitimately, but the dispute would then become bilateral in nature after 1971.

In the second phase, the Kashmir dispute became bilateral under the Shimla Agreement, after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Under the treaty, India returned the seized lands but did not surrender Turtuk, Dhothang, Tyakshi, and Chalunka, located in Ladakh. The Ceasefire Line was changed to the Line of Control (LOC). Under this treaty, India treats Kashmir as a bilateral dispute and denies any third-party intervention, including the UN. The treaty also discourages both sides from unilaterally altering the LOC.

However, India acted unilaterally and launched Operation Meghdoot in 1984, taking control of the Siachen Glacier. On 23rd April 2025, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, alleging Pakistan’s involvement in the 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack, and Pakistan retaliated by suspending the Shimla Agreement on 24th April 2025.

The Kargil War of 1999 ended in status quo ante bellum, and the negotiations at the Agra Summit of 2001 failed; the Agra treaty was not signed. The second phase saw people-to-people interaction, especially the 2008 Cross-LOC Barter Trade, which started in 2008 and was unfortunately unilaterally suspended by India in 2019.

The third phase is marked by unilateral actions of India. On 5th August 2019, India unilaterally abrogated the special status of Indian-occupied Kashmir along with Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which had allowed Indian-occupied Kashmir to have its own constitution and freedom to legislate on all subjects except defence, communications, and foreign policy.

This act violated Article 370(3), which provides a mechanism for repealing Article 370 and was dependent upon the recommendation from the Constituent Assembly of Indian-occupied Kashmir. This act also violated clauses 7 and 8 of the Instrument of Accession and the Delhi Agreement, but the Indian Supreme Court upheld the unilateral revocation of Article 370.

Pakistani officials had said they would take the case of Kashmir before the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC), but there was no progress in this regard, possibly due to legal reasons, because Pakistan is not a member of the ICC nor recognises the definition of aggression provided under the Rome Statute of the ICC.

India opposed the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Gilgit-Baltistan; however, Pakistan has interpreted UNSC Resolution 2344 of 2017 to back the CPEC. Pakistan had also announced in 2020 its intention to grant provincial status to Gilgit–Baltistan, but so far, this has not materialised.

It is not clear if the Kashmir dispute will be resolved anytime soon, but what is clear is that subsequent developments have made implementing UNSC Resolutions difficult, if not impossible. What is certain is that Kashmiris exercising their right to self-determination has now become uncertain.

© The Friday Times