So far in this debate, we have discussed the Afghan Taliban's demonstrated hostility towards Pakistan; their violation of Pashtunwali, Islamic fraternity and good neighbourliness; Pakistan's ability to fight a '1.5 Front' Indo-Afghan aggression, if imposed; Afghanistan and CARs relevance; the 'Haqqani Complexity'; the fallacy of Talib victory against the Soviet Union and the US-NATO Combine; the absurdity of Indo-Afghan nexus against Pakistan; and the collapse of 3rd round of Pak-Afghan talks in Istanbul because of Afghan recalcitrance on agreeing to Pakistan's minimum ask i.e. reigning in the TTP.

TTP splinter group, Jamaat ul Ahrar, claimed responsibility for the November 11 suicide attack in Islamabad. And APS-style catastrophe by the same TTP hosted by 'brotherly Afghan Talibs', the 21st Century protectors of Islam, was averted in Cadet College Wana.

Pakistan's policy calibrations about effective, quick and punishing response to Afghan-based terrorism; and the prevalent regional sentiment, and discussions among the diplomatic corps especially in the West Plus, about the least palatable option of regime change in Kabul, are under spotlight. Pakistan's strategic patience, after employing all leverages, has not triggered behavioral change among Afghan Talibs.

Some other aspects of contemporary Afghanistan. First, Afghanistan's essential military geography. Hindu Kush divides Afghanistan into a mainly Pashtun south and largely non-Pashtun north. The latent hostility between Pashtuns and the non-Pashtun Tajik minority (the second largest ethnic group) and Uzbeks (Dostum's Taliban massacre in Sheberghan) during the First Republic (2002-2021), is a well-documented fault line. No other Afghan ethnicity is as integrated as Pashtuns are with Pakistan. Pashtun........

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