Is China unhappy, if not annoyed, with Kabul's position on groups that it considers detrimental to the interests of the entire region? Does China's interest in Afghanistan limited to counter-terrorism (CT) only or extends beyond CT? How does its positioning vis a vis the "ETIM threat" define Beijing's South Asia policy? For how long can the Afghan Taliban expect largess while staying indifferent, if not insensitive, to concerns of friendly countries?

This week took Wang Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, to an unusual trip first to India and then to Islamabad and Kabul. The India leg was an attempt to reconnect with a country that basked in glory as the "strategic partner of the US and Europe" until Donald Trump's reentry into the White House. India's "darling of the US" also drew both New Delhi and Beijing apart for several years. After enduring slurs from Trump, the Indian leaders have warmed up again to China.

The best outcome of the thaw with New Delhi probably was Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar's reiteration that "Taiwan is part of China." It obviously lent a special flavour to Wang Yi's re-warming visit — a fence-mending underway.

Though skepticism still surrounds this bonhomie as to whether it will survive after Trump's........

© The Express Tribune