Asia Defense | Security | East Asia

Has China Really Entered the Three-Carrier Era?

The Fujian’s Taiwan Strait transit highlights both the progress and the limits of China’s carrier ambitions.

China’s Fujian aircraft carrier in Nov. 2025.

On June 23, China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, transited through the Taiwan Strait. According to an official statement, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed that the carrier had passed through the Strait, prompting the Taiwanese military to activate “its joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance measures to closely monitor” the vessel’s movements. 

The ministry also released a black-and-white aerial image of the Fujian, taken from high altitude. Notably, no carrier-based aircraft were visible on the flight deck, though the ministry did not disclose the precise time or location at which the photo was taken.

This image, released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense on June 23, 2026, shows China’s Fujian aircraft carrier during a transit of the Taiwan Strait.

At first glance, the transit may appear to be part of routine training for China’s newest aircraft carrier. Yet its strategic significance should not be underestimated. The Fujian’s passage through one of Asia’s most sensitive waterways comes amid a broader pattern of Chinese military and maritime law-enforcement activity around Taiwan. Beijing’s Ministry of National Defense described the operation as routine training and indicated that similar activities would continue in the future. 

Foreign media have largely interpreted the transit in the context of Taiwan’s recent rapid combat-readiness drills and China’s growing use of coast guard and maritime safety vessels east of Taiwan. Taken together, these developments suggest that Beijing is experimenting with a layered pressure campaign, combining naval and air power, coast guard enforcement, and aircraft carrier training to test Taiwan’s responses across multiple domains.

However, the transit should also be assessed in light of the current state of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) three-carrier force. The Liaoning recently returned to its home port in Qingdao after more than 40 days of operations in the Western Pacific. The Fujian’s southward movement at this moment suggests that its next phase of training may focus on the South China Sea, potentially involving coordination with the Shandong’s carrier aviation units or operating within the broader framework of China’s southern maritime strategy. 

Yet the current size and maturity of China’s carrier aviation force remain insufficient to fully support three operational carriers at the same time. Although China now possesses three aircraft carriers, its available carrier-based aircraft, pilots, deck crews, and maintenance capacity do not yet appear adequate to meet the full operational demands of a three-carrier navy.

This limitation is closely related to the different launch and recovery systems used by China’s carriers. The PLA has long emphasized a “small steps, fast running” approach to naval modernization, using successive platforms to test and incorporate new technologies. This approach has enabled rapid technological progress, but it has also produced two distinct carrier aviation systems. The Liaoning and Shandong rely on ski-jump launch systems, while the Fujian is equipped with an electromagnetic aircraft launch system. As a result, China’s three-carrier fleet is not simply a matter of having three hulls. It requires the development and management of two different carrier aviation ecosystems.

China’s industrial capacity is unlikely to be the main bottleneck; the Chinese navy can almost certainly build additional aircraft. The more difficult question is whether it has enough qualified carrier pilots and flight deck personnel capable of operating under two different launch-and-recovery systems. 

Carrier aviation is not merely an extension of land-based air force operations. Pilots must master night operations, poor-weather recoveries, high-tempo launch and recovery cycles, complex electromagnetic environments, and the unique demands of operating from a moving deck at sea. The transition from ski-jump operations to electromagnetic catapult operations adds another layer of complexity. Although the commissioning and testing of the Fujian marks a new stage in Chinese carrier aviation, it does not mean that the PLAN has immediately acquired a mature carrier combat capability.

If the PLAN were to attempt simultaneous full-deck deployments of all three carriers, the strain would be considerable. If the Fujian were to embark around 40 fixed-wing aircraft, the Liaoning and Shandong........

© The Diplomat